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I. INTRODUCTION
Regulatory responses to predatory lending have from the outset raised two
interrelated questions: What kinds of regulations will best combat predatory lending
and who should enact those regulations? The former question asks what types of
loan terms and lending practices should be proscribed or prescribed; the latter
question asks which level of government, federal or state, is in the better position
to make the policy judgments that inform the regulation of mortgage lending
activities. As a growing number of state legislatures' have concluded that state level
statutes are necessary because the substantive regulations enacted by the federal
government through the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA),2
Truth in Lending Act (TILA),) and Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of
1994 (HOEPA)4 are inadequate to protect consumers, the locus of regulation-the
who question-has became increasingly contentious. The introduction of bills in
Congress that seek to regulate a particular actor in the "lending pipeline" the
mortgage broker has inserted the jurisdictional question into a new context. It is
this particular manifestation of the locus question that this Article will examine:
1. As of early 2007, thirty-six states and the District of Columbia have enacted antipredatory
lending statutes. Subprine and Predatory Lending: New Regulatory Guidance, Current Market
Conditions, and Effects on Regulated Financial Institutions: Hearing before the H. Subcomn. on
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Services. II 0th Cong. add.
at 38-43 (2007) (Exhibit B to statement of Steven L. Antonakes, Massachusetts Conmm'r of Banks,
Conf of State Bank Supervisors) (containing a chart that lists each ofthese statutes and provides a brief
comparison of provisions in each). For a detailed analysis ofthe antipredatory lending statutes in effect
in twenty-eight states at the end of 2004, see WEI Li & KEITH S. ERNST, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, THE BEST VALUE IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET: STATE PREDATORY LENDING REFORMS 2
(2006), http://www.responsilelending.org/pdfs/rr010-State Effects-0206.pdf
2. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2000).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (2000).
4. Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2190 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
[Vol. 59:61
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Are the proposals for federal regulation of mortgage brokers desirable or should the
task of mortgage broker regulation be left to the states?
The desirability of some degree of regulation of mortgage brokers is widely
recognized. Three facts support this consensus of opinion. First, as the National
Association of Mortgage Brokers (NAMB) proudly proclaims, mortgage brokers
originate approximately 70% of all residential mortgage loans' in the subprime
lending market where the problem of predatory lending is most acute. 6 Thus,
regulation of mortgage brokers is warranted by their extensive involvement in a
troubled market. Second, NAMB acknowledges that mortgage brokers have unique
access to borrowers and spend significant amounts of time working with
borrowers. Such access, which is unique among the participants in the lending
pipeline, provides predatory brokers with ample opportunity to manipulate and
exploit consumers. Thus, opportunity coupled with the incentive to extract high fees
supports regulation. Third, mortgage brokers have been identified as participating
in predatory lending.' In short, there are quantitative, qualitative, and experiential
bases for regulating mortgage brokers at one or more levels of government.
To date, the direct regulation of mortgage brokers has taken place at the state
level, as forty-nine (soon to be fifty) states regulate mortgage brokers through
licensing or registration statutes and accompanying administrative regulations .' On
the other hand, although RESPA, TILA, and HOEPA certainly impose some
requirements on mortgage brokers, the federal government has not yet enacted any
5. MODEL STATE STATUTE INITIATIVE: LICENSING, PRE-LICENSURE EDUCATION AND CONTINUING
EDUCATION FOR ALL ORIGINATORS (Nat'l Ass'n of Mortgage Brokers, 2005) [hereinafter MSSI],
reprinted in Licensing and Registration in the Mortgage Industry: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Housing and Community Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 109th Cong. 70 (2005)
[hereinafter Licensing & Registration Hearing]. The percentage ofloans originated by mortgage brokers
rises to 71% in the subprime market. Residential Mortgage Origination Channels, M BA RESEARCH
DATA NOTES (Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, Wash., D.C. ), Sept. 2006, at 1, 3, http://mortgagebankers.org
/files/Bulletin/InternalResource/44664 September2006-ResidentialMortgageOriginationChannels.pdf
6. See ChristopherL. Peterson, Federalism andPredatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory
Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 10 12 (2005) (discussing prime versus subprime markets and the
legitimate and predatory aspects of the latter); Kathleen C. Engle & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three
Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1259-61 (2002)
(identifying different loan markets and the presence of predatory lending).
7. Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 51 (statement of Joseph L. Falk, Chair,
Government Affairs Comm., National Association of Mortgage Brokers).
8. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 58.10 (West 2002) (stating that the purpose of Minnesota's
mortgage broker licensing statute is "to help consumers avoid being victimized by
unscrupulous... mortgage brokers"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-102(8) (West 2002) (recognizing that
many homeowners have become "vctims of overreaching lenders").
9. Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 98 (statement of Joseph A. Smith, Jr., North
Carolina Comm'r of Banks, Conf of State Bank Supervisors). At the time of Mr. Smith's testimony,
Alaska and Colorado were the only states that did not have licensing or registration laws for mortgage
brokers. Id. Subsequently, both states passed mortgage broker licensing statutes. For a chart that briefly
describes the requirements of licensing statutes in all states except Alaska and provides links to
regulator web sites, see Mortgage Academy, State-by -State Licensing Rules for Mortgage Brokers (Dec.
12,2006), http://www.mortgageacademy.org/state by_state.htm. The Alaska statute, which takes effect
in 2008, is Enrolled Bill 162, which amends ALASKA STAT. § 06.01.050 (2007) and adds a new chapter
60, the Mortgage Lending Regulation Act.
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statutes to regulate mortgage brokers through licensing or certification laws that
would condition entry into the mortgage brokering business, monitor the conduct
of brokers once in business, and sanction brokers who engage in undesirable
conduct. That situation could change, however, as two bills were introduced in the
109th Congress to subject mortgage brokers to federal regulation.'0 With their
introduction of these bills, the tension between the states and the federal
government concerning the appropriate locus of regulation has found a new outlet.
After deconstructing the federal proposals for mortgage broker regulation and
comparing them to existing state-level broker licensing statutes, this Article
concludes that the federal proposals are undesirable for three reasons: they lack
utility, they unwisely preempt provisions of state broker licensing statutes, and they
embody a hermeneutical model that is based on faulty assumptions about consumer
behavior in a residential mortgage loan transaction.
Following the Introduction, this Article consists of two main parts. In Part II
of this Article, I analyze the two proposals for direct federal regulation of mortgage
brokers on the basis of utility. Any utility-based analysis requires a defining
statement, as utility can be understood only in connection with some goal. Utility
could be understood, for example, in terms of facilitating transactional efficiency
by allowing brokers to peddle loans subject only to the "corrective force" of the
marketplace. In this Article, however, utility is to be understood in the sense
expressed in the purposive language found in the bills themselves, which is the
effectiveness at protecting consumers from predatory behavior by mortgage
brokers. Drawing on a taxonomic hierarchy previously developed for a comparative
analysis of state mortgage broker licensing statutes," I conclude that the proposed
federal laws lack utility because they only partially duplicate some of the regulatory
mechanisms found in state licensing statutes and wholly omit others. Thus, the
proposed federal laws are at once superfluous and incomplete.
Included in the taxonomic analysis in Part 1I of this Article is an evaluation of
a proposal for a national registry of mortgage brokers and a database containing
information about them. 2 A national registry and database could be useful tools in
the battle against predatory lending, as they would enable consumers to identify and
avoid brokers who have engaged in undesirable behaviors. The registry and
database are not optimal regulatory measures because they promote a "borrower
beware" approach rather than addressing the incentive structures that encourage
brokers to engage in predatory behavior. 3 Nevertheless, increasing the visibility of
predatory brokers by increasing the amount of publicly available information about
10. Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices Reduction Act, H.R. 1994, 109th Cong. (2005);
Responsible Lending Act, H.R. 1295, 109th Cong. (2005). A third bill directed at mortgage broker
regulation has been introduced in the 110th Congress. Senate Bill 1299, the Borrower's Protection Act
of 2007, seeks to "establish on behalf of consumers a fiduciary duty and other standards of care for
mortgage brokers and originators." An examination of S. 1299 is beyond the scope of this Article.
11. Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., A Taxonomic Analysis of Mortgage Broker Licensing Statutes:
Developing a Programmatic Response to Predatory Lending, 36 N.M. L. REV. 297, 297 98 (2006)
[hereinafter Wilson, Taxonomic Analysis].
12. H.R. 1295 §§ 511-512.
13. See discussion infra Part III.B.
[Vol. 59:61
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them would be a positive development. The information in the database could also
be useful to lenders who want to avoid working with independent brokers who have
committed predatory acts or who want to avoid hiring such brokers as in-house
employees. Lastly, maintaining a national registry and database could be a suitable
role for the federal government given its ability to effect nationwide participation.
Despite these possible advantages, the federal registry and database proposal
that has been introduced in Congress is undesirable for two reasons. First, the
proposal is currently inseparable from high-cost lending regulations that are
decidedly not in consumers' best interests.' 4 The benefits of the registry and
database are simply not worth the cost of the many detrimental provisions found in
other titles of the bill. Second, a similar registry and database is being jointly
pursued by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) and the American
Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators (AARMR)."5 These state-level
regulators would be the source of information collected for the proposed federal
registry and database; therefore, the scope of included information would be no less
comprehensive if the CSBS AARMR proposal were favored over a federal plan.
Further, if the goal truly is to protect consumers against predatory practices by
mortgage brokers, the progressiveness of state efforts to combat predatory lending,
in contrast to the comparatively tepid federal efforts, favors placing the registry and
database in the hands of state regulators.
In the first section of Part III, I analyze the proposed federal laws for their
preemptive effect on state mortgage broker licensing statutes. I demonstrate that
even the bill that purports to establish only a regulatory floor for broker licensing
and education requirements and leaves the states free to enact stricter rules has a
significant and adverse impact on state broker licensing laws. Any contention to the
contrary simply fails to recognize or acknowledge the effect of matters as
fundamental as the exclusive definitions given to terms. For example, a narrow
definition of mortgage broker that is made binding on the states inescapably limits
the categories of persons-and consequently the number of persons-a state can
regulate via a licensing statute.
Furthermore, it is improper to separate even the truly non-preemptive broker
licensing and education requirements from the expressly preemptive provisions that
govern loan terms and practices and to treat them as if they were unconnected. Two
of the most effective tools available for states to regulate mortgage broker behavior
are the power to suspend or revoke a broker's license and the power to impose
sanctions or provide remedies for broker misconduct. Any federal law that
establishes exclusive rules pertaining to broker activities necessarily limits a state's
14. See discussion infra Part II.C.3.b.
15. The Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) and the American Association of
Residential Mortgage Regulators (AARMR) have formed ajoint legislative task force "to identify and
implement specific tools and approaches to reduce the regulatory complexity and compliance burden
associated with making mortgage loans in more than one state, and to improve the state regulators'
enforcement tools against abusive lending practices and improve the professionalism of the industry."
Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 100; see also id. at 103-05 (discussing specifically
the CSBS AARMR registry and database of mortgage brokers).
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power to define conduct that can trigger license suspension or revocation. Similarly,
any federal law that imposes exclusive substantive limitations on or creates
procedural barriers to claims against brokers necessarily limits a state's power to
take action against a broker who has engaged in behavior that the state has
determined to be harmful to its citizens. The claim of "baseline only" regulation of
mortgage brokers" can never be true so long as the federal government claims
exclusive power to define proscribed and permitted broker practices or determine
sanctions and remedies. By failing to acknowledge these repercussions, federal
regulation can effect a "stealth preemption"' of many of the important regulatory
mechanisms found in state mortgage broker licensing statutes.
In the second section of Part 111, I examine the hermeneutic filter upon which
the proposals for federal regulation of mortgage brokers depend. The hermeneutics
that underlies each of the federal proposals is grounded in the liberal economic
view that government regulation is generally unnecessary and undesirable because
it interferes with a self-regulating marketplace and with the exercise of individual
will, which is presumed to be rational and utility maximizing." The anthropology
that results from this view is captured in the phrase homo economicus.' 9 The liberal
hermeneutics, with its homo economicus anthropology, is not, however, the only
interpretative tool that can be applied to predatory lending in general and to
mortgage brokers in particular.2" In fact, several of the underlying premises of that
view are contradicted by insights from psychology and behavioral economics.2'
Once this hermeneutical framework is deprived of its claim to exclusivity, interests
other than the unfettered distribution of credit are legitimized and can become part
of the debate. When efficient distribution of credit ceases to be the determinative
factor and becomes instead a factor against which other values must be admitted,
the oft-invoked "patchwork" criticism22 leveled at state-level regulation loses much
of its force.
16. Licensing& Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of the Honorable Robert Ney,
Chair, H. Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity); see discussion infra Part L.A
(discussing the falsity of the "floor, not ceiling" claim).
17. I coin this phrase as a retort to the claim by a lending industry apologist that a state's
imposition of "a host of consumer protection and compliance requirements on mortgage lenders,
enforced by severe remedial provisions" constituted a -stealth override' of federal preemption" of state
regulation of rates, fees, and other economic loan terms. Donald C. Lampe, Wrong from the Start?
North Carolina's "Predatory Lending" Law and the Practice vs. Product Debate, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 135,
143 (2004).
18. See Mark A. Sargent, Utility, the Good and Civic Happiness: A Catholic Critique of Law and
Economics, 44 J. CATH. LEG. STUD. 35, 39-40 (2005).
19. See id. at 39. Homo economicus is "economic man."
20. See CAROL JOHNSTON, THE WEALTH OR HEALTH OF NATIONS: TRANSFORMING CAPITALISM
FROM WITHIN 122-25 (Pilgrim Press 1998) (proposing an anthropology captured in the phrase homo
salutaris-healthy human). This anthropology is discussed in more detail at Part IlI.B.
21. See Patricia A. McCoy, A BehavioralAnalysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L. REV. 725,
726 (2005).
22. See Donald J. Lampe, Predatory Lending Initiatives, Legislation and Litigation: Federal
Regulation, State Law and Preemption, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 78, 86 (2002) ("[T]he actions of
some states and municipalities [have created] a non-uniform patchwork of unrealistic laws .... ").
[Vol. 59:61
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Also in the second section of Part 111, 1 examine a few of the ethical
repercussions of the liberal hermeneutics that are embedded in the proposals for
federal regulation of mortgage brokers. I begin by emphasizing the connection
between one's way of interpreting the world-one's hermeneutical filter-and the
way one acts in the world one's ethics. Stated succinctly, the way one sees the
world determines the way one acts in it.23 The uncritical acceptance of the liberal
hermeneutics by the federal proposals for mortgage broker regulation manifests
itself in two unfortunate ways. First, under the banner of autonomy and willful
decisionmaking, the hermeneutics dictates that only those broker behaviors that
sink to the level of duress, unconscionability, or outright fraud are unethical. All
other practices, no matter how sharp or exploitative, are deemed acceptable
expressions of "free bargaining." Second, the liberal hermeneutics limits the range
of ideas that can be considered to combat predatory lending. Disclosures, general
education about mortgage lending, and individual loan counseling are acceptable
because they prepare consumers to exercise their "freedom" to bargain with a
predatory broker. Conversely, proposals that would regulate broker behavior toward
consumers on the ground that predatory brokers exploit asymmetries in information
and power or that would redefine the mortgage broker-borrower relationship either
to impose a general suitability requirement or to impose a borrower's agency
regime-analogous to the buyer's agency regime found in real estate sales
brokerage are rejected as anathema. These ethical dimensions of the prevailing
hermeneutics need to be named and brought into the public debate about predatory
mortgage lending and brokering.
11. A UTILITY-BASED CRITICISM OF PROPOSALS FOR FEDERAL REGULATION OF
MORTGAGE BROKERS
Federal regulation of mortgage brokers has been the specific subject of a
congressional hearing before the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community
Opportunity, which is a subcommittee of the House Committee on Financial
Services.24 At a Hearing on Licensing and Registration in the Mortgage Industry
(Licensing Hearing), then-chair Representative Robert Ney acknowledged that
federal-level regulation of mortgage brokers "has not garnered a great deal of public
attention and comment" and that "[m]ost of the debate [about predatory lending]
23. See PARKER J. PALMER, To KNOW AS WE ARE KNOWN: A SPIRITUALITY OF EDUCATION 21
(1983) ("The way we interact with the world in knowing it becomes the way we interact with the world
as we live in it.").
24. All five bills introduced in the 109th Congress that sought to address predatory lending were
assigned to the House Committee on Financial Services. In addition to House Bill 1994 and House Bill
1295, bills assigned to this committee that sought to address predatory lending by means other than
direct regulation of mortgage brokers were House Bill 200, the Prevention of Predatory Lending
Through Education Act; House Bill 1182, the Prohibit Predatory Lending Act; and House Bill 4471,
the Fair and Responsible Lending Act. H.R. 1994, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1295, 109th Cong. (2005);
H.R. 200, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1182, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4471, 109th Cong. (2005). House
Bill 4471 is very similar to Titles I and 11 of House Bill 1295. Compare H.R. 4471 with H.R. 1295
§ § 101 219 (both imposing minimum standards on the home mortgage industry).
2007]
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has centered on which potentially abusive lending practices should be curtailed or
prohibited in an effort to protect borrowers from unscrupulous lenders. 25 The
broker-directed focus of House Bill 1994 and House Bill 1295 and the statements
made at the Licensing Hearing confirm that the idea of federal regulation of
mortgage brokers has moved into the foreground. Along with that movement has
come the debate over the proper locus of regulation.
This question was squarely presented at the Licensing Hearing in the opening
remarks of Representative Ney:
In an industry in which some say that opportunities exist for
bad actors to exploit and take advantage of both sophisticated and
unsophisticated consumers alike, how should access to that
industry be regulated to help insulate consumers from such
practices?
• . . [T]here are currently a number of state laws and
legislative movements on the state level that address this very
topic.
Are these sufficient? Or, would some degree of minimum
uniformity be helpful?26
These framing questions reveal two distinct issues: the sufficiency of state
regulations and the degree of uniformity (or diversity) among them. The sufficiency
of regulation, especially as the federal proposals compare to existing state laws, will
be taken up in this Part. The uniformity interest raises important preemption issues
and will be taken up in Part II1.
Because the states already regulate mortgage brokers through licensing or
registration,27 federal regulation of mortgage brokers has utility28 only if it
contributes a regulatory approach, insight, or mechanism not found in state laws.
Absent such an original contribution, a federal law would be, at best, superfluous.
At worst, a federal law that is not comprehensive in scope and seeks only modest
goals could engender ill-advised imitation by some states and thus retard regulatory
innovation or even roll back existing protections. With regard to the sufficiency of
existing state regulation, the initial task, then, is to test the utility of proposed
federal mortgage broker regulations against existing state-level mortgage broker
licensing statutes.
25. Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 38 (statement of the Honorable Robert
Ney, Chair, H. Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 98 (statement of Joseph A. Smith, Jr., North Carolina Comm'r of Banks, CSBS); see
also supra note 9 (discussing legislation passed by Colorado and Alaska that bring the total to fifty
states).
28. See discussion supra p. 64 (stating that utility is to be understood in terms of effectiveness at
protecting consumers from predatory behavior by mortgage brokers).
[Vol. 59:61
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A. A Frameworkfor Comparison
The two bills that propose federal licensing or registration of mortgage brokers
differ significantly; likewise, the state laws that regulate mortgage brokers are not
uniform. Thus, an initial hurdle is to establish a framework that promotes a
comparison of related items despite diversity in their forms of organization and
phrasing. A taxonomic organization is well suited to that task.29 In a taxonomy,
items are grouped into categories based on common traits or characteristics.
Further, items within each category are organized into subcategories that express
relevant differentiations within one trait or characteristic. The principal categories,
and the subcategories within them, are ordered in a hierarchy that reflects an
increasingly complex or sophisticated expression of a predetermined principle.30 A
taxonomic analysis provides a common typological vocabulary, which facilitates
a comparative analysis of related but nonuniform items.3 A taxonomic analysis also
provides a reasoned basis for judging one comparator to be better than another,
precisely because one is a more complex or sophisticated expression of the chosen
organizing principle.32 Because of these benefits, a taxonomic framework will be
applied in this Part to the bills that propose federal regulation of mortgage brokers.
Defining the organizing principle for the hierarchical arrangement is at once
perhaps both the most important decision in a taxonomic analysis and the most
open to challenge. This is true because that principle contains a normative standard
against which characteristics are judged. Fortunately, the preambles of the bills
themselves provide the organizing principle. One bill identifies its purpose as
seeking "[t]o protect home buyers from predatory lending practices."33 The other
professes that its purposes include seeking "[t]o protect consumers against unfair
and deceptive practices in connection with higher cost mortgage transactions [and]
to strengthen the civil remedies available to consumers." 4 These purposive
statements thus validate effective consumer protection as the organizing principle
of a taxonomic hierarchy. Taking the bills' authors at their word, this Article will
judge the utility of the proposals for federal regulation of mortgage brokers, in
comparison with state licensing statutes, according to each bill's ability to protect
consumers from predatory acts by mortgage brokers.
In a previous article, I examined state-level mortgage broker licensing statutes
and proposed that the provisions of those statutes can be organized into three
distinct functional categories. 5 I identified these categories as (I) the gatekeeping
function, (2) the regulatory oversight function, and (3) the mortgage broker-
29. See Wilson, Taxonomic Analysis, supra note 11, at 298. For a classic example of a taxonomic
hierarchy and an explanation of the process for constructing one, see TAXONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL
OBJECTIVES: THE CLASSIFICATION OF EDUCATIONAL GOALS, HANDBOOK 1: COGNITIVE DOMAIN 10 11,
13-17 (Benjamin S. Bloom ed., David McKay Co. 1969) (1956).
30. See Wilson, Taxonomic Analysis, supra note 11, at 298.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. H.R. 1994, 109th Cong. (2005).
34. H.R. 1295, 109th Cong. (2005).
35. Wilson, Taxonomic Analysis, supra note 11, at 299.
2007]
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consumer relationship-defining function. 6 Within the first two categories, I
identified multiple regulatory tools that are used to carry out the relevant function.3
Within the third category, instead of identifying complementary means to achieve
a stated function, I identified alternative formulations of a function-defining the
nature of the relationship between a mortgage broker and a consumer. 8 These
models, which share the common characteristic of attempting to describe (in terms
that go beyond caveat emptor) the legal duties a broker owes to a consumer, are (1)
the prescribed contract model,3 9 (2) the optional agency model,40 and (3) the
mandatory, but limited, agency model.4'
When the categories and constituent subcategories are arranged according to
the principle of effective consumer protection-a principle also validated by the
purposive language found in states' broker licensing statutes42-the following
hierarchy emerges:"
III. The mortgage broker-consumer relationship-defining function
4. mandatory borrower's agency model44
3. mandatory, but limited, agency model
2. optional agency model
1. prescribed contract model
36. Id.
37. Id. at 300-25.
38. Id. at 325-39.
39. Id. at 326 30.
40. Id. at 330 36.
41. Id. at 336-39.
42. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-243.04 (2005) ("The Banking Commission may adopt any
rules when it deems necessary to ... provide for the protection of the borrowing public . .
43. The hierarchy should be read from the bottom up.
44. This model does not yet exist in a systematic form. The North Carolina Mortgage Lending
Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-243.01-.18 (2005 & Supp. 2006), includes some provisions that bear a
striking resemblance to provisions in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, but that act does not
create a complete and systematic agency regime. See Wilson, Taxonomic Analysis, supra note 11, at
337-39 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 379, 382, 385 (1958)). The creation of a
mandatory borrower's agency regime is supported by two developments: (1) the trajectory ofregulation
in the past decade, which has seen a caveat emptor approach give way to a reasonable, tangible net
benefit standard for loan refinancing and to a suitability standard for any loan; and (2) the creation of
a mandatory buyer's agency regime in the related area of real estate sales brokerage following the
abolition of mandatory subagency by the National Association of Realtors. For a full expression of the
argument for a borrower's agency regime, see Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Effecting Responsibility in the
Mortgage Broker-Borrower Relationship: A Role for Agency Principles in Predatory Lending
Regulation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471 (2005) [hereinafter Wilson, Effecting Responsibility]. A similar
idea is the proposal in S. 1299 to create fiduciary duties that a mortgage broker would owe to a
consumer. S. 1299, 110th Cong. (2007).
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11. The regulatory oversight function
5. identify the acts and omissions that trigger the suspension or
revocation of a license
4. provide public sanctions and private remedies for broker misconduct
3. require continuing education as a condition of licensure
2. impose record keeping, record storage, and record retention duties
1. require correction and updating of license application disclosures
1. The gatekeeping function
6. utilize a portion of mortgage broker application fee for antipredatory
lending programs
5. define the criteria for approval or denial of an application for licensure
4. ensure the financial responsibility of the applicant, including bonding
and liquidity requirements
3. ensure the technical competency of the applicant, including pre-
licensure education and testing
2. verify the personal character and business background of the applicant
(and of parent companies, subsidiaries, and controlling persons)
1. establish the scope of the licensing requirement and thereby the
scope of regulation by defining which persons are either subject to
or exempt from licensure
That this taxonomic hierarchy is unlikely to be exhaustive does not preclude
its usefulness. The objection made in this Article to the proposed federal laws is not
that they are similarly comprehensive as state licensing laws, with differences being
but a matter of emphasis and about which reasonable persons could disagree.
Instead, the objection is that entire subcategories of regulatory mechanisms are
wholly missing in the proposed federal laws. Under these conditions, the taxonomic
hierarchy presented above is more than adequate.
Another question that may be raised is whether there is much value in
analyzing bills that were not passed out of committee during the 109th Congress.
Even though the 1 10th Congress has convened, these bills merit examination for
at least three reasons. First, over the past several years there is a clear record of
consolidation of regulatory control at the federal level at the expense of state
regulation.5 Federal regulation of mortgage brokers can be seen as a component of
that consolidation, and it is reasonable to anticipate that in the future the federal
government will devote more, rather than less, attention to mortgage brokers.
Second, the state of the economy and growing use of exotic loan products could
propel proposals for federal antipredatory lending legislation to a high place on
45. See OCC Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264 (Aug. 5,2003); 12 C.F.R.
§ 545.2 (2007); 12 C.F.R. § 701.21 (b) (2007). The OCC's extension ofits preemption authority to state-
chartered operating subsidiaries, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2007), was upheld in Watters v. Wachovia Bank,
N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572 73 & n.13 (2007).
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Congress's agenda.46 If rising interest rates, a falling economy, a depreciation of
real estate values (or some combination of the three), in conjunction with interest
rate escalators or balloon loan maturity dates, push the number of personal
bankruptcies and home foreclosures beyond their already record high levels,
Congress could feel pressure to "do something." That "something" could be to pass
whatever antipredatory lending related legislation can be resurrected easily and
quickly.4 Third, it is important for the protection of America's consumers that bills
proposed in the future be subjected to critical analysis, and one of the goals of this
Article is to provide a transferable analytical framework.
The two bills introduced in the 109th Congress that include provisions
specifically applicable to mortgage brokers are the Predatory Mortgage Lending
Practices Reduction Act (HR 1994)48 and the Responsible Lending Act (HR
1295). 49 When these proposals for federal regulation of mortgage brokers are
analyzed taxonomically, they come up wanting. HR 1994 contains only one
mechanism for carrying out the initial-level gatekeeping function and does nothing
to advance the administrative oversight function or to redefine the mortgage broker-
consumer relationship in a way that includes prescriptive duties. HR 1295 includes
only two mechanisms in the gatekeeping category and only one mechanism in the
regulatory oversight category. Like HR 1994, HR 1295 makes no attempt to
redefine the broker-consumer relationship. Of greater consequence is the fact that
a number of provisions in HR 1295 actually impede, not promote, consumer
protection.
HR 1994 and HR 1295 are sufficiently different in scope, approach, and nature
of their deficiencies, that they will be examined separately. Any analytical overlap
that results is small and is offset by gains in the clarity of discussion. HR 1994 is
deconstructed first in Part 11.B; HR 1295, which is substantively more problematic,
is deconstructed in Part II.C.
46. Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 3 (statement of the Honorable Robert Ney,
Chair, H. Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity) ("Congress should also heed the
warning from Fed Chairman Greenspan that creative financing of mortgages could backfire if the
economy dips and interest rates increase.").
47. A witness at a congressional hearing held on May 8, 2007, said that House Bill 1295 from the
109th Congress is "an interesting starting point for reform that is worthy of consideration." The Role
of the Secondary Market in Subprime Mortgage Lending: Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 5
(2007) (statement of Howard Mulligan, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery LLP).
48. H.R. 1994, 109th Cong. (2005).
49. H.R. 1295, 109th Cong. (2005).
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B. The Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices Reduction Act HR 1994
1. The Gatekeeping Function Protecting Consumers by Controlling
Entry into the Mortgage Brokering Industry
HR 1994 seeks to "protect home buyers from predatory lending practices" by
raising the level of competency and professionalism in the mortgage brokering
industry through mandatory federal certification that will ensure each broker is
trained and knowledgeable with regard to subprime lending.5" Before examining
any of the substantive provisions of the bill, two preliminary observations must be
made. First, the bill is directed solely at predatory lending in the subprime market."'
While it is generally accepted that predatory practices occur much more frequently
in the subprime lending market than in the prime market, that fact does not mean
there are no prime market eligible consumers who need protection from predatory
brokers. A high credit score does not necessarily ensure financial sophistication. 2
Furthermore, the opportunity to obtain loans from a variety of sources, including
regulated depository institutions, that are available to prime market eligible
consumers and generally not available to subprime market borrowers does not
ensure that a consumer understands principles of mortgage financing or the tools
that facilitate comparison shopping for a loan. Inexperienced borrowers of any
credit rating can be overwhelmed by the complexity of the mortgage financing
process and can be susceptible to exploitation by a predatory broker. State mortgage
broker licensing statutes do not differentiate between prime and subprime lending,
and the restricted scope of HR 1994, by itself, renders the bill inferior to state-level
licensing statutes.
In addition, HR 1994 is based on the highly questionable assumption that
knowledge and expertise are reliable proxies for honesty and that professional
behavior will flow automatically from technical training and knowledge. There is
50. H.R. 1994. Training, education, and examination of brokers is the exclusive focus of section
2 of House Bill 1994. Id. § 2 (proposing amendments to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of
1974 (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2610 (2000)). Section 3 would impose "best practices" requirements on
lenders who make high cost mortgages. Id. § 3 (proposing amendments to the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2000)). Section 4 provides for broker decertification for commission of an
unfair or deceptive act or practice (UDAP). Id. § 4; see discussion infra Part ll.B.2. Section 5 would
prohibit precontroversy arbitration clauses. Id. § 5 (proposing amendments to the end of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act (CCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 1693r (2000)). Section 6 would make grants to
community development corporations for predatory lending education. Id. § 6 (proposing amendments
to the end of the Community Development Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1994 (DBFIA),
12 U.S.C. §§ 4701-4718 (2000)). Each section is very short, and the bill is not as comprehensive as this
list of sections would make it appear.
51. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
52. Anecdotal evidence for this proposition comes from the author's personal experience of
consulting with prime eligible borrowers, including highly educated persons holding terminal degrees,
to whom the jargon and procedures of mortgage lending were completely foreign. Further evidence is
provided by the growing incidence of home foreclosures in neighborhoods consisting of newly
constructed homes that were financed with loans containing predatory terms or involving predatory
practices, even though the borrower or buyer could have qualified for better terms than those provided
by the developer or a mortgage broker.
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no assurance that the correlation is direct; in some circumstances the relationship
could be inverse. The assumption in the bill echoes the claim made by NAMB that
most predatory practices can be attributed to inadvertent mistakes by brokers who
do not know better. Increased knowledge and training, NAMB argues, will
eliminate the mistakes and produce good loan brokering practices.53 If, as is more
likely, a broker's predatory behavior is intentional precisely because it is so
profitable, then additional training and knowledge simply widen the informational
and power asymmetries between the broker and the consumer and produce a more
effective predator. With these two foundational limitations in mind, the substantive
limitations of the bill can be considered.
The central provision of HR 1994 states:
No person may, in connection with a subprime federally mortgage
related loan, provide... mortgage brokerage services unless such
person is, at the time of the provision of such services, certified by
the Secretary [of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)]
pursuant to this section as having been adequately trained with
regard to subprime lending.54
While most of the prerequisites for certification are unspecified and are left to be
formulated by the Secretary of HUD (Secretary), HR 1994 does direct that the final
regulations require each broker to demonstrate, by written examination, a sizeable
body of knowledge, including (1) "[t]he requirements and limitations under Federal
laws regarding mortgage lending";5 5 (2) "[l]egal and appropriate practices, methods,
conventions, and terms of subprime lending in all lending functions"; 56 (3) "[i]llegal
and inappropriate practices, methods.... and terms of predatory lending"; 57 and (4)
"[b]asic contract law regarding competency and incapacity to contract. 5 8
The certification requirement is intended to discharge a gatekeeping function
by preventing uninformed and unskilled persons from entering the mortgage
brokering industry and having the opportunity to harm consumers. Although
prelicensing education and testing requirements are legitimate gatekeeping
mechanisms, requiring them at the federal-level would result in a negligible
advance for consumers, as prelicensing and education requirements are common
in state licensing statutes. Further, unlike HR 1295, discussed below, the federal
certification requirement of HR 1994 applies without regard to prelicensing
education and testing requirements that may be imposed under state law. The
existence of licensing requirements imposed by multiple jurisdictions, here the
53. See Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 53 (statement of Joseph L. Falk,
Chair, Government Affairs Comm., NAMB).
54. H.R. 1994 § 2(a) (2005) (proposing a new section 13(a) to be added as an amendment to
RESPA).
55. Id. (proposing a new section 13(b)(2)(A) to be added as an amendment to RESPA).
56. Id. (proposing a new section 13(b)(2)(B) to be added as an amendment to RESPA).
57. Id. (proposing a new section 13(b)(2)(C) to be added as an amendment to RESPA).
58. Id. (proposing a new section 13(b)(2)(D) to be added as an amendment to RESPA).
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federal government and states, is not by itself a reason to reject HR 1994. The
increased compliance costs associated with multiple jurisdiction regulation is
simply a function of a federalist form ofgovernment. These issues exist whether the
multiple levels involved are the federal government and the states, or among the
several states themselves. At the same time, however, if dual-level regulation is to
exist, it should serve some valuable purpose.
Besides seeking to ensure the technical competency of mortgage brokers, the
only other gatekeeping mechanism found in HR 1994 is the threshold task of
defining the persons who are subject to certification because they qualify as a
,'mortgage broker." Establishing the scope of the term mortgage broker is crucial
to the gatekeeping function for the obvious reason that excluded persons are not
required to demonstrate the knowledge or training-taken in the bill as indicia of
professionalism required of persons subject to regulation. For that reason,
consumers are best protected by a broad definition of mortgage broker with the
minimum number of exemptions.
HR 1994 contains a broad, if not particularly elaborate, definition of mortgage
brokerage services. The bill defines these services as "the bringing together of a
borrower and lender to obtain a federally related mortgage loan and the rendering
of settlement services, by a person who is not an employee or exclusive agent of a
lender."5 9 The breadth of the bringing together criterion is admirable, but similarly
broad definitions can be found in state mortgage broker licensing statutes. For
example, North Carolina's licensing statute applies to all persons who act as a
mortgage broker, which it defines as a person who
act[s], for compensation or gain, or in the expectation of
compensation or gain, either directly or indirectly, by accepting
or offering to accept an application for a mortgage loan, soliciting
or offering to solicit a mortgage loan, negotiating the terms or
conditions of a mortgage loan, issuing mortgage loan
commitments or interest rate guarantee agreements to borrowers,
or engaging in tablefunding of mortgage loans, whether such acts
are done through contact by telephone, by electronic means, by
mail, or in person with the borrowers or potential borrowers.6"
HR 1994 thus contributes nothing noteworthy to the concept of gatekeeping or to
its implementation.
Duplication of state-level education and testing requirements and of scope of
coverage provisions is not the only consumer protection deficiency of HR 1994.
More serious is the bill's omission of several other important gatekeeping
mechanisms found in state licensing statutes. The task of screening mortgage broker
license applicants to exclude persons who pose a risk to consumers is more
complex than HR 1994 allows. Omitted gatekeeping mechanisms include: (1)
59. Id. (proposing a new section 13(f)(1) to be added as an amendment to RESPA).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-243.01(1) (2005).
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application form disclosures concerning the personal character and business
background of the license applicant; (2) investigation procedures that enable
regulators to verify information supplied by the applicant; (3) surety bond or liquid
assets requirement; (4) license approval criteria other than technical competence;
and (5) dedication of a portion of application fees to fund antipredatory lending
programs. 6' To the extent that the bill relies on the verification of technical
competency alone to discharge the gatekeeping function, it is inferior to the more
comprehensive state licensing statutes.
2. The Regulatory Oversight Function Protecting Consumers by
Affecting Broker Behavior Through Sanctions and Remedies
HR 1994 is similarly deficient with regard to its regulatory oversight
provisions. Ofthe five mechanisms that comprise that function under the taxonomic
hierarchy, the bill addresses only one explicitly: requiring correction and updating
of license application disclosures. Its terms might be capable of stretching far
enough to include a second mechanism, but nothing compels that result.
Just as control over initial licensure is a powerful regulatory tool, so too is
control over the conditions of license continuation and renewal. By requiring
periodic and conditional renewal of a license, regulators can ensure that brokers
who were deemed fit for licensure have in fact acted responsibly toward consumers.
One condition for license renewal found in state mortgage broker licensing statutes
is mandatory continuing education.62 HR 1994 does not expressly include this
regulatory oversight mechanism, but it could be inferred from the broadly phrased
delegation of authority that directs the Secretary to "establish standards and
procedures for recertification of individuals whose certifications are expiring.
'63
The Secretary could determine that these standards and procedures for
recertification include mandatory continuing education; then again, the Secretary
might not.
Many state mortgage broker licensing statutes wisely condition license renewal
on completion of a stated number of hours of continuing education.64
Acknowledging that the mortgage financing industry changes rapidly, NAMB
likewise supports continuing education for brokers.65 Given the emphasis in HR
61. For an example of a mortgage broker licensing statute that uses license application fees as a
gatekeeping mechanism, see MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 58.10 (West 2002). For a discussion of the use of
license application fees as a gatekeeping mechanism and the rationale for including application fees
within the gatekeeping function, see Wilson, Taxonomic Analysis, supra note 11, at 310-11.
62. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294.260 (LexisNexis 2004) (requiring all mortgage loan
brokers to participate in continuing professional education); 4 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 3M.0301 (2007)
(providing that mortgage lending licensees can receive credit for participation in programs conducted
by providers approved to present continuing education programs).
63. H.R. 1994 § 2(a) (proposing a new section 13(d) to be added as an amendment to RESPA).
64. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 286.8-255(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2004) (requiring applicants to
complete twelve hours of professional education).
65. Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 52 (statement of Joseph L. Falk, Chair,
Government Affairs Comm., NAMB).
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1994 on the adequacy of training received by mortgage broker license applicants,
the absence of an explicit continuing education requirement is inexplicable and
indefensible. In a complex and rapidly changing industry, training that fails to
remain current cannot be considered adequate.
Additionally, by failing to impose a continuing education requirement, HR
1994 misses out on an opportunity to dictate the content that the education brokers
would receive. Some state licensing statutes specify that a portion of continuing
education hours must be devoted specifically to predatory lending issues.66
Similarly, NAMB's Model State Statute Initiative (MSI) recommends ethics
education for brokers.67 These state statutes, and the MSI, recognize that continuing
education can perform a channeling function. Perhaps at least some brokers will be
persuaded not to engage in predatory behavior if they are compelled to confront the
economic, personal, and social damage caused by predatory lending and if they are
made aware of the sanctions that can be imposed for causing that damage.
Administrative sanctions and private remedies are additional regulatory
oversight mechanisms. HR 1994 utilizes two forms of administrative sanctions for
the commission of unfair or deceptive acts or practices: administrative
decertification and administrative fines. Administrative decertification, which can
take the form of either suspension or revocation of a broker's federal certification,
is a powerful regulatory tool, as HR 1994 declares that one cannot legally engage
in any mortgage brokering activity without federal certification.68 With one
laudable exception, discussed below, HIR 1994 simply delegates to the Secretary the
authority to "establish standards and procedures for suspension and revocation of
the certification under this section."6 9 Other than providing for procedural fairness
by requiring an opportunity for an affected broker to be heard,7 ° the bill provides
no guidance for what those standards should be. The bill need not be so vague.
State licensing statutes, while also delegating rulemaking authority to state
regulators, enumerate a number of specific acts that can result in license suspension
or revocation.7'
One provision in HR 1994 that does deserve praise is its requirement that the
final implementing regulations provide for decertification of any broker who
engages in unfair or deceptive acts or practices (UDAP). The bill mandates that the
standard for decertification "shall include an agency determination or a judgment
66. See, e.g., 808 Ky. ADMIN. ERGS. 12:095(1)(1) -(2) (2007) (requiring that of the twelve hours
of biannual continuing education for mortgage brokers at least six hours must provide instruction about
K'S 360.100, Kentucky's High Cost Home Loan Act). Furthermore, "[o]nly the provisions of K'S
360.100 pertaining to predatory lending and penalties for noncompliance may be included in the
education requirements." Id. 12:095(1)(2).
67. MSSI, supra note 5, at 66 (outlining the required topics of "Ethics, Diversity, and
Sensitivity").
68. H.R. 1994 § 2(a) (proposing anew section 13(a) to be added as an amendment to RESPA).
69. Id. (proposing a new section 13(c) to be added as an amendment to RESPA).
70. Id. (proposing a new section 13(c)(1) to be added as an amendment to RESPA).
71. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 4975 (providing for revocation for violations of certain provisions
of the Finance Code); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-243.11 (West 2005) (providing for revocation for
misrepresentation, failing to abide by contracts, and several other practices).
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by a court of competentjurisdiction that a certified individual has engaged in an act
or practice that is unfair or deceptive under section [4] of the [bill]." ' 2 The UDAP
prohibition in that section is stated directly: "It shall be unlawful, in providing any
mortgage lending services for a subprime federally related mortgage loan or any
mortgage brokerage services for such loan, to engage in any unfair or deceptive act
or practice."" The sanctions for committing an unfair or deceptive act or practice
are decertification, civil penalties, and enforcement options under TILA. 74
Unfortunately, the UDAP prohibition also vests considerable discretion in the
Secretary of HUD. HR 1994 makes the Secretary responsible for developing
"interpretive rules and general statements of policy with respect to unfair or
deceptive acts or practices" and for promulgating "regulations defining with
specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive, 75 but the bill provides
no guidance to shape the final content of those rules and regulations. Broad
delegation of rulemaking authority is commonplace, but the lack of guidance in HR
1994 is made even more problematic than one might expect, as the rulemaking
authority for the UDAP provisions is vested jointly in the Secretary, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Trade Commission.76 Further,
the rulemaking authority vested in this triumvirate is permissive, not mandatory.7
Given that federal-level efforts to combat predatory lending have lagged
significantly behind those of the states, consumers can bejustifiably skeptical about
the content of UDAP rules that may or may not emerge from the collective action
of these three agencies. Also to be acknowledged is the animosity of the mortgage
financing industry to the use of UDAP statutes to establish violations of high-cost
loan statutes. The strength of this animosity is captured in one industry apologist's
attempt to disparage UDAP laws by calling their use by consumer advocates a
stealth evasion of federal law.78 If the UDAP provisions of HR 1994 are to have any
real consumer protection impact, they cannot depend on the unguided discretion of
the Secretary, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, and the Federal
Trade Commission.
Apart from designating a UDAP violation as a basis for regulatory sanction,
HR 1994 omits many of the other oversight and enforcement mechanisms found in
state mortgage broker licensing statutes. Perhaps the most important of the omitted
mechanisms is the failure to require a broker to post a surety bond or to maintain
other liquid assets which could satisfy public and private claims.7 The existence
72. H.R. 1994 § 2(a). Although the bill refers to "section 5," it certainly means to refer to section
4.
73. Id. § 4(a).
74. Id § 4(e).
75. Id. § 4(b)(1) (2).
76. Id. § 4(b).
77. The bill states that the parties "may jointly issue" rules and regulations. Id. § 4(b) (emphasis
added).
78. Lampe, supra note 17, at 143.
79. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 58.08 (West 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-243.05(t) (2005);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 2203(a) (2001). For a discussion of the importance of a surety bond as a
regulatory tool, see Wilson, Taxonomic Analysis, supra note 11, at 319 21.
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of a surety bond and liquid assets as a condition of licensure protects consumers by
ensuring that at least some amount of money will be available to compensate them
for losses caused by mortgage brokers' predatory acts. In the absence of a bond or
other assets, consumers can be left facing a judgment-proof broker or a "fly-by-
night" broker who has closed up shop. Regulatory oversight mechanisms omitted
from HR 1994 include: (1) disclosure update requirements by which brokers inform
regulators of changes in the brokering business, including changes in principals and
employees; (2) record keeping requirements-such as the scope of documents that
must be retained, the format in which they must be retained, and the length of time
they must be retained which preserve evidence for regulators and harmed
consumers; and (3) license suspension or revocation triggers (for reasons other than
UDAP violations) based on a variety of financial misdeeds or acts that evidence
moral turpitude." When judged by the bill's self-proclaimed goal of consumer
protection and when compared to state mortgage broker licensing statutes, the
regulatory oversight provisions of HR 1994 exhibit little utility.
3. The Relationship-Defining Function Protecting Consumers
by Redefining the Mortgage Broker-Consumer Relationship
Of all the means available to combat predatory lending, redefining the legal
nature of the relationship between a mortgage broker and a consumer is the least
used. The more widely used approaches have been to enact positive laws that (1)
proscribe the most egregious loan products and lending and brokering practices; (2)
prescribe certain acts by lenders and brokers, especially providing information
disclosures to consumers; (3) seek to improve general financial literacy among
consumers by increasing the availability of information about the mortgage lending
process; and (4) seek to improve an individual consumer's decisionmaking through
individual loan counseling. As discussed in Part III below, the reliance on these
mechanisms and the comparative lack of attention paid to rethinking the broker-
consumer relationship is not coincidental but follows from assumptions that are
accepted uncritically.8'
The value of proscriptive rules is indisputable, as they deny predatory brokers
the use of a number of tools that have been used to prey on consumers. Predatory
tools that have been proscribed include fully prepaid credit insurance products,
asset-based lending, loan flipping with no benefit to the borrower, recommending
default on an existing loan, at-will acceleration clauses, and mandatory arbitration
80. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294.090(7) (LexisNexis 2004) (prohibiting mortgage brokers
from engaging, directly or indirectly, in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a "fraud or deceit upon any person"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 58.13 (West 2002) (prohibiting
mortgage brokers from making any statement that "has the capacity or tendency to deceive or mislead
a borrower"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-243.11(8) (2005) (prohibiting a mortgage broker from engaging
in any practice that "is not in good faith or fair dealing"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 2210(a)(3) (2001)
(prohibiting a mortgage broker from engaging in "unconscionable conduct which takes advantage of
a borrower's lack of bargaining power or lack of understanding of the terms or consequences of the
transaction").
81. See discussion infra Part III.
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clauses. The proscriptive approach alone is not able to stop predatory lending,
however, because some loan terms that are predatory in some circumstances are
appropriate in other circumstances. Adjustable interest rates, introductory interest
rates, and balloon payments, for example, are legitimate financing tools-in the
right context. In an inappropriate context, as when a consumer does not understand
their effect or when they are not suited to the consumer's needs and financial
situation, they can inflict great harm. Similarly, refinancing an existing loan can be
a sound decision-in the right context. In an inappropriate context, as when the
consumer is unlikely to recapture the refinance costs and the new loan results in
economic benefit to no one other than the lender and broker, urging a refinance is
predatory. For this reason, proscription is a necessary but not sufficient
methodology. The vice lies not in the loan terms per se; instead, the vice lies in the
broker's exploitation of an asymmetry of information and the resulting asymmetry
of power.
Asymmetry of information is the origin of the general education and individual
counseling methodologies. The incidence of predatory lending can be reduced, it
is proposed, if consumers receive education and counseling that will enable them
to protect themselves.8 2 HR 1994 embraces these paths to consumer empowerment
by providing funding to "make grants to nonprofit community development
corporations to provide education and training to borrowers, potential borrowers,
and community groups regarding illegal and inappropriate practices,
methods ... and terms of predatory lending."83 Education and counseling likely
benefit some consumers, but the effectiveness of these methodologies is limited.
The effectiveness of general education is limited because it assumes that
information will reach potential victims of predatory lending and that they will
process the information to the degree necessary to perceive and avoid predatory
terms and practices. The emphasis on individual counseling is limited because it
assumes the intervention of a trained counselor for every potentially predatory loan
and that a counselor's advice will outweigh a broker's enticements or the
constraints of the borrower's financial situation.
Furthermore, education and counseling are no panacea because they are
fundamentally misdirected. By forcing consumers to defend themselves in the
lending process, education and counseling initiatives look past the root problem
itself, which is the combination of incentives and relationship structures that
encourage and enable lenders and brokers to prey on consumers. With few
exceptions, such as the reasonable tangible net benefit requirement found in
82. See Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295,356-57 (2005)
(noting mixed conclusions concerning the effectiveness of consumer education at helping consumers
avoid predatory loans).
83. H.R. 1994, 109th Cong. § 6(a) (2005) (proposing a new section 122(a) to be added as an
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Regulation Z84 and some state antiflipping statutes, 85 mortgage brokers and
consumers are generally treated as fully autonomous actors whose only obligation
to the other is to refrain from acts that would constitute fraud, duress, or
unconscionability. Caveat emptor is the order of the day.
The problem with this view, as I have argued elsewhere,86 is that it is
inconsistent with reality. Consumers who have been victimized by predatory
lending repeatedly state that they placed their trust in, and relied on, their mortgage
broker.17 Their reliance is understandable and reasonable, as mortgage brokers
inculcate these feelings of trust and confidence by pretending to befriend the
consumer, by promising to "help" the consumer, by "taking care of' the consumer's
financial problems, and by exploiting relationship-based marketing techniques.88
Predatory brokers then breach the trust they have engendered by exploiting the gaps
in the proscriptive, educational, and counseling methodologies. Consumers believe
that the broker who works with them also worksfor them. Unfortunately, the law
generally does not support that understanding.
The aim of the education and counseling methodologies, as noted above, is not
to change anything about the nature of the broker-consumer relationship; instead,
the aim is to make consumers better negotiators within an arm's length contracting
context that remains unexamined. It is here that the limitations of education and
counseling are highlighted. In addition to the pragmatic issue concerning the
feasibility of turning lay consumers who are often targeted by predatory brokers
precisely because oftheir lack of education, experience with financial products, and
access to depository lenders-into a negotiating equal of a professional mortgage
broker, the education and counseling initiatives burden, and implicitly blame, the
wrong party. Rather than seeking to change the context that fosters exploitative
broker behavior, consumers are told to protect themselves from being exploited. If,
despite education and counseling, consumers fall victim to predatory practices, then
it is the consumer who has "failed" in the loan negotiation process. Even if a
consumer's decision to enter into a predatory loan can be attributed to subconscious
decisionmaking heuristics,89 which the broker intentionally exploited, it is still the
84. Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 226.34 (2007).
85. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 24-9-4-2 (LexisNexis 2006) (placing restrictions on refinancing
existing loans); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.390 (LexisNexis 2004) (restricting the right to refinance
loans on the same property).
86. Wilson, Effecting Responsibility, supra note 44, at 1507.
87. See Ronald Benton Brown et al., RealEstate Brokerage: Recent Changes in Relationships and
a Proposed Cure, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 25, 34 (1995).
88. As one tool of predation, a broker will seek to influence a potential borrower's
decisionmaking by emphasizing some connection between broker and borrower. The connection is
intended to disarm the consumer's sense of caution and distrust. A public service announcement aired
by the Indiana Secretary of State, whose duties include combating investment fraud, acts out a scenario
where a predatory investment broker uses church membership as a relational and disarming tool. For
a discussion of push marketing in predatory lending, see Azmy, supra note 82, 333 35.
89. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the
Federal Government's Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 384 85 (1994)
(discussing availability heuristics, anchoring heuristics, and optimism heuristics); McCoy, supra note
21, at 727 37 (discussing loss aversion, reference dependence, and choice heuristics).
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consumer who is to blame. The legal obligation of a broker not to establish and
exploit trust, and not to exploit information and power asymmetries, is
inconceivable because such obligations are inconsistent with the arm's length
relationship context. By its reliance on education and counseling, HR 1994 accepts
this model as orthodoxy.
Fortunately, there is some reason to hope that this methodological myopia can
be changed. At least a few states have taken steps in their licensing statutes to
redefine the mortgage broker-consumer relationship to create-or at least
permit-legal duties owed by a broker to a consumer. One option, found in
Vermont's broker licensing statute, 90 is to prescribe a contract form that specifies
the duties owed by a mortgage broker to a borrower.9' A second option, found in
the licensing statutes of Kentucky 92 and Minnesota,93 is to create an opt-out agency
regime. A third option, found in North Carolina's licensing law, is to create
mandatory but limited agency duties.94 Although each of these models has
shortcomings,9" each effects a contextual change by creating duties that a mortgage
broker owes to a consumer simply by virtue of their relationship. One effect of the
redefinition is to bring the legal view of the mortgage broker-consumer relationship
more in line with the real world view. Another effect is to remove the appearance
of validating exploitative practices under the banner of "arm's length negotiation."
Because HR 1994 makes no attempt to critically examine the currently prevalent
view of broker-consumer relations, it fails to make any advance into the highest
taxonomic category.
HR 1994 is not openly antagonistic to consumers, especially because it
recognizes the importance ofUDAP laws in the battle against predatory lending and
expressly disclaims preemption of state mortgage broker licensing laws. 96
Nevertheless, HR 1994 does little to achieve its stated goal of protecting
consumers. It is not a satisfactory defense of the bill to say that it should be
evaluated only with regard to the limited goals it seeks to achieve and should not
90. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 2200 2239 (2001 & Supp. 2006).
91. Id. § 2219.
92. Ky. STAT. ANN. §§ 294.010-.990 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2006).
93. Minnesota Residential Mortgage Originator and Servicer Licensing Act, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 58.01 .17 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007).
94. Mortgage Lending Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-243.01-.18 (2005 & Supp. 2006).
95. See Wilson, Taxonomic Analysis, supra note 11, at 326 39 (discussing deficiencies specific
to each statute).
96. Sections I through 4 of HR 1994 are silent about the bill's relationship to state laws that also
regulate the testing and certification of mortgage brokers. H.R. 1994, 109th Cong. §§ 1-4 (2005). One
could assume, therefore, that the bill does not seek to preempt state laws, as there is neither an
expression of intent to occupy the field nor any reason to infer preemption. One section of the bill,
section 5, dealing with arbitration agreements, does address "coordination with other law." Id. § 5(a)
(proposing a new section 1003(c) to be added as an amendment to the Consumer Credit Protection Act
(CCPA)). It provides that "[n]o provision of this section shall be construed as annulling, altering,
affecting, or superseding any Federal law, or the laws of any State, relating to arbitration.... except
to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with the provisions of this section, and then only to the
extent of the inconsistency." Id. This provision creates a base level of regulation and does not prohibit
states from imposing additional requirements. Id.
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be criticized on the ground that other goals are not attained. That apologetic simply
begs the questions of why the bill seeks to do so little and whether a federal law
should be created for such modest ends. Nor can HR 1994 be defended on the
ground that the Secretary will fill in the gaps. The rulemaking authority granted to
the Secretary is limited to regulations "as may be necessary to carry out the
amendment made by subsection (a) of this section. '97 That amendment is limited
to confirming that mortgage brokers are adequately trained.98 It cannot properly be
expanded to encompass the many other omitted gatekeeping, administrative
oversight, or relationship-defining goals. The achievements of HR 1994 are simply
too modest to justify interjecting the federal government into the regulation of
mortgage brokers, especially because the states are already engaged in regulation
that is far more systematic, comprehensive, and creative.
C. The Responsible Lending Act HR 1295
The second bill that would provide for federal regulation of mortgage brokers
is HR 1295, the Responsible Lending Act.99 This bill will be addressed in two
sections. First, in this section, the bill will be analyzed for its utility. This analysis
is similar in format to the utility analysis performed on HR 1994 above 00 but
differs significantly in content due to the presence of terms unique to HR 1295. In
this section, the Article will focus on two parts of Title V: Subtitle A, which
imposes a federal licensing requirement and minimum standards for obtaining that
license, and Subtitle B, which creates a federal database that would contain the
names of all mortgage brokers and certain information about them. This section will
demonstrate that HR 1295 lacks utility because it only partially duplicates
consumer protections already found in state mortgage broker licensing statutes and
omits a number of other regulatory mechanisms. Furthermore, although the
sponsors of HR 1295 claim that the bill contains numerous provisions that protect
consumers from predatory lending, many of the provisions in the bill relate more
to advancing the interests of the lending and brokering industries than to advancing
the interests of consumers. In fact, with regard to both substantive rules applicable
to high-cost loans and the regulation of mortgage brokers, HR 1295 would roll back
existing consumer protections.
HR 1295 is also addressed in Part II of this Article, where the bill will be
analyzed specifically with regard to its preemptive effect on state mortgage broker
licensing statutes. This analysis will demonstrate that another title of the bill not
denominated as broker specific, Title 1, is indeed relevant to the regulation of
97. Id. § 2(b).
98. Id. § 2(a) (proposing a new section 13(a) to be added as an amendment to RESPA).
99. H.R. 1295, 109th Cong. (2005). This Article analyzes HR 1295 only with regard to its impact
on mortgage broker regulation. For a detailed analysis of other aspects of HR 1295, see Legislative
Solutions to Abusive Mortgage Lending: Hearing before the H. Subcomms. on Housing and Comm unity
Opportunity & Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Services,
109th Cong. 16 add. (2007) (Exhibit A to statement of Steve Nadon, Chief Operating Officer, Option
One Mortgage, H&R Block, Coal. for Fair and Affordable Housing).
100. See discussion supra Part IIB.
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mortgage brokers and to the framing question of the proper locus of broker
regulation. Contrary to assurances made at the Licensing Hearing that HR 1295
would not impact states' ability to regulate mortgage brokers more aggressively
than required by the bill-that HR 1295 creates a regulatory floor but not a
ceiling'0 ' a significant number of provisions in Title I of the bill are indeed
preemptive and would in fact limit a state's ability to regulate mortgage brokers by
way of licensing statutes. Thus, a goal of Part III is to expose the stealth
preemption0 2 of state mortgage broker licensing statutes that would occur by virtue
of the connection between Titles I and V.
1. The Gatekeeping Function-Protecting Consumers by Controlling
Entry into the Mortgage Brokering Industry
Subtitle A of title V of HR 1295 contains some provisions that could be
characterized as gatekeeping mechanisms. At the same time, Subtitle A suffers from
two defects. First, it omits many other gatekeeping mechanisms found in state
licensing statutes. Second, it undermines the effectiveness of all gatekeeping
mechanisms through an overly constrictive definition of the term mortgage broker.
Subtitle A establishes minimum standards that state laws must meet to enable
mortgage brokers to avoid federal regulation. °3 With regard to conditions on entry
into the mortgage brokering business, Subtitle A obligates states to (1) "require
licensing for mortgage brokers;"' 04 (2) "require, as a condition of the issuance of
license, that an applicant submit a written application for a license;"' 0' (3) "require,
as a condition of the issuance of a license, that an applicant complete at least 24
hours of education on primary and subordinate mortgage financing and pass a
written examination upon the completion of such training;"'0 6 (4) "require a
criminal background check to be performed on the applicant;"' ' and (5) "establish
minimum testing standards for mortgage brokers."' 8 Through these items, Subtitle
101. See Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 2 (statement ofthe Honorable Robert
Ney, Chair, H. Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity).
102. See Lampre, supra note 17, at 143.
103. H.R. 1295 § 501(a) ("The Federal mortgage broker requirements established pursuant to this
title shall apply only with respect to States that, upon the expiration of the 3-year period beginning on
the date of the enactment of this Act, have not enacted and do not have in effect uniform State laws and
regulations described in subsection (b)."). Despite the use of the word "uniform" in reference to state
laws, section 501(a) generally contains only broad directives, not specific requirements, and does not
place-until the exemptions from coverage listed in section 501(b)(2)-any restrictions on a state's
power to enact laws that exceed the federal minimum standards. Id.
104. Id. § 501(b)(1)(A).
105. Id. § 501(b)(1)(B).
106. Id. § 501(b)(1)(C).
107. Id. § 501(b)(1)(D).
108. Id. § 501(b)(1)(E).
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A addresses two of the six mechanisms of the gatekeeping function in taxonomic
hierarchy. 0 9
It would be possible to conclude that the worst failing of these two mechanisms
is that they are redundant expressions ofgatekeeping mechanisms already found in
state mortgage broker licensing statutes. State license application forms already
tend to be lengthy and seek detailed information about the applicant's personal
background and business history."0 States already recognize that information
disclosure and regulatory verification play important roles in keeping potentially
predatory actors from having access to consumers."' It is unlikely that whatever
federal application requirements might be developed would bring about a
meaningful improvement of existing state practices, especially as those federal
standards seek only to establish minimum requirements. States also already
recognize the importance of prelicensing education, and, as noted earlier, some
state licensing statutes contain innovative provisions that require education dealing
specifically with predatory lending." 12
A more serious concern involves skepticism that the provisions of Title V
would remain as minimum standards; the concern is that the provisions represent
the first step toward mandatory uniform not minimum standards. A close
reading of the testimony at the Licensing Hearing reveals that the phrase "uniform
standards" appears to be used almost interchangeably with the phrase "minimum
standards."" 3 It is no secret that lending industry participants who operate on a
109. The requirements that brokers obtain a license and that the process for obtaining a license
begins with a written application are so fundamental to regulation of mortgage brokers that those items
are assumed and do not even appear in a hierarchy of regulatory mechanisms that enable licensure to
combat predatory practices. Prelicensing education and testing, which are treated as two items in HR
1295, are a single mechanism in the hierarchy. The second gatekeeping mechanism present in HR 1295
is the criminal background check, although the background check required by many state licensing
statutes is far more comprehensive. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
110. For examples of the extensive background disclosure, both personal and occupational,
required by state mortgage broker licensing statutes, see Commonwealth of Kentucky: Office of
Financial Institutions, Downloadable Forms, http://www.kfi.ky.gov/industryinfo/formsapps.htm (follow
hyperlinks under "Mortgage Application/Forms") (last visited Sept. 16, 2007); NC Mortgage Lending
& Licensing Compliance Forms, http://www.nccob.org/nccob/mortgage/formsfees/ (follow "MUI"
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 16, 2007); State of Vermont, Application for Lender, Mortgage Broker
and/or Sales Finance Company Licenses, http://www.bishca.state.vt.us/BankingDiv/lenderapplic/
license applic mortg-lenders mortg-brokers.htm (follow hyperlinks under "MU Forms") (last visited
Sept. 16, 2007). The background disclosure sections ofthe multistate broker application forms proposed
by the CSBS/AARMR Regulatory Task Force are similarly comprehensive. See Licensing &
Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 110-52 (appendix to statement of Joseph A. Smith, Jr., North
Carolina Comm'r of Banks, CSBS).
111. See Wilson, Taxonomic Analysis, supra note 11, at 302 07.
112. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
113. The blending of these terms begins in title V of HR 1295, which refers to "[m]inimum
[s]tandards" in the title to Subtitle A but speaks of"[u]niform [s]tate [f]aws" in HR 1295 section 501 (b).
H.R. 1295 § 501(b). Picking up on the uniformity path, the emphasis changes to promoting
"standardiz[ation of] mortgage brokerage licensing requirements" and on states' "adher[ence] to
uniform standards." Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 8, 48 (statements of Teresa A.
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nationwide basis covet uniform national standards to reduce what they see as
unnecessary compliance burdens imposed by individual state laws." 4
The gatekeeping provisions of Subtitle A are also deficient because at least
three mechanisms are omitted. HR 1295 does not provide for the use of application
fees for antipredatory lending programs, does not define the criteria for approving
or denying a license application, and does not seek to ensure the financial
responsibility of mortgage brokers by imposing a surety bond or financial liquidity
requirement. 1 5 As previously discussed concerning HR 1994, partial redundancy
and limited objectives are inadequate reasons for involving the federal government
in the regulation of mortgage brokers.
1 6
The most serious objection to Subtitle A, however, relates to the most
fundamental gatekeeping mechanism-establishing the scope of persons who are
subject to, or excluded from, the licensing requirement. If persons are excluded
from the licensing requirement, the number and vigor of other gatekeeping
mechanisms are immaterial. In short, the effectiveness of mortgage broker
regulation is directly related to the inclusiveness of coverage and inversely related
to its exclusions. In this regard, HR 1295 is a significant step backwards for
consumer protection because its exemptions from coverage are unacceptably
expansive.
HR 1295 begins innocuously enough. According to section 501, the bill
imposes minimum federal standards for the regulation of "mortgage brokers,""' 7 a
term which is defined in section 503 to mean "a person who engages for
compensation, either directly or indirectly, in the acceptance of applications for
mortgage loans for others, solicitation of mortgage loans on behalf of borrowers,
or negotiation of terms or conditions of loans on behalf of borrowers or lenders.""18
From the standpoint of consumer protection, the bill turns in the wrong direction
in section 501(b)(2), which identifies eight classifications of persons and
organizations that are excluded from the bill's definition of mortgage broker.119
Some of these exemptions should be uncontroversial because the exempted person
or organization is otherwise regulated, such as nonprofit budget or debt counseling
services, 120 or poses little threat of predatory conduct, such as a political subdivision
or a college or university.
12 1
One exemption, however, is so broad that it threatens to swallow the rule.
Section 501(b)(2)(F)(iii)(V) exempts from the definition of mortgage broker any
person who "is a creditor (as defined in section 103(f) of the Truth in Lending Act)
who makes or invests in residential real estate loans aggregating more than
114. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
115. See Wilson, Taxonomic Analysis, supra note 11, at 319 21 (discussing the importance ofthe
bond or financial liquidity requirement to consumer compensation).
116. See discussion supra Part lI.B.
117. Title V is entitled "Requirements for Mortgage Brokers," and the title of section 501 is "State
Regulation of Mortgage Brokers." H.R. 1295 tit. V, § 501.
118. Id. § 503(3).
119. Id. § 501(b)(2)(A)-(H).
120. Id. § 501(b)(2)(B).
121. Id. § 501(b)(2)(D).
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$1,000,000 per year, and irrespective of whether such creditor is licensed ... by an
agency of a State."': The breadth of this exemption was uniformly criticized at the
Licensing Hearing by consumer advocates and lending industry advocates alike. A
consumer advocate testified that the exemption granted by section 502(b)(2)(F)
covers almost any mortgage broker in my State who might
otherwise not be exempted. This essentially permits brokers to
avoid State and Federal regulation, seemingly by table-funding a
few loans a year ... and immediately assigning them .... It is
hard to imagine any mortgage broker who would not be covered
by this exemption.' 23
Even the representative ofthe Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) expressed
concern that "the exceptions to licensing contained within Title V ... provide too
many loopholes where an individual could easily avoid licensure."'2 4 The MBA
warned that "[t]he subcommittee may wish to examine the exemption ... to ensure
that it does not establish such a low threshold as to allow a mortgage broker an easy
way to avoid licensure."'2 5 A statute that permits a large number of brokers to
escape regulation fails in its gatekeeping function.
2. The Regulatory Oversight Function Protecting Consumers by
Affecting Broker Behavior Through Sanctions and Remedies
Other than the mortgage broker database that would be established by Subtitle
B,126 subtitle A of HR 1295 contains only one of the five regulatory oversight
mechanisms listed in the taxonomic hierarchy: the imposition of mandatory
continuing education for licensees. Section 501(b)(1)(F) "require[s] continuing
education of mortgage brokers, including at least 12 hours of education on a
biennial basis, a minimum of 2 hours of which shall address ethics education.'
127
Similar to the gatekeeping mechanisms, the mildest criticism of the continuing
education requirement of HR 1295 is that it duplicates continuing education
requirements found in state mortgage broker licensing statutes.
128
A more serious criticism of the regulatory oversight provisions of HR 1295 is
that the bill omits all of the other oversight mechanisms that promote consumer
protection. Omitted from HR 1295 are (1) duties to correct and update information
contained on initial application and subsequent license renewal forms; (2) duties
pertaining to the type of records a broker must keep, the format in which they must
122. Id. § 501(b)(2)(F)(iii)(V).
123. Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 12 (statement of Daniel F. Hedges,
Director, Mountain State Justice, Inc.).
124. Id. at 48 (statement of Teresa A. Bryce, Senior Vice President and Director of Legal and
Corporate Affairs, Nexstar Financial Corporation).
125. Id.
126. See discussion infra Part l.C.3.b.
127. H.R. 1295 § 501(b)(1)(F).
128. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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be preserved, the location at which they must be kept, and the length of time they
must be preserved; and (3) public sanctions and private remedies for broker
misconduct, including action against a surety bond. 2 9
The omission of sanctions and remedies from Title V is exacerbated by the
presence in Title I of limitations on consumer remedies, safe harbors for lenders and
brokers, and procedural impediments to consumer claims. These limitations and
safe harbors, which will be discussed in more detail in Part III below,3 0 are relevant
to the oversight function of broker licensing statutes because they would severely
hinder a state's ability to use sanctions and remedies to regulate broker behavior.
It is only by ignoring the intimate connection between the substantive provisions
relating to high-cost loan terms and lending practices in Title I and the minimum
standards applied to mortgage brokers in Title V 3' that the bill's cosponsor can
claim that Title V does not preclude states from imposing stricter regulations. The
connection cannot, of course, be legitimately ignored, and the claim of"a floor and
not a ceiling" is both disingenuous and untrue. On this ground, Subtitle A does not
merely duplicate existing consumer protection mechanisms; it actually erodes them.
3. The Relationship-Defining Function Protecting Consumers by
Redefining the Mortgage Broker-Consumer Relationship
HR 1295 makes no attempt to combat predatory lending by redefining the
mortgage broker-consumer relationship. Instead, HR 1295 uses consumer
counseling and mandatory disclosures to fill in the gaps that exist in the proscriptive
approach. These "consumer empowerment" methodologies, which are found in
Titles I and 11,132 merely seek to fine tune the existing framework of mortgage
broker-consumer relations rather than to critically examine that framework. HR
1295 does, however, include an additional and new form of consumer
empowerment: the creation of a national registry and database of mortgage brokers,
authorized by Subtitle B of Title V. The counseling and disclosure provisions of
HR 1295 will be addressed first, followed by a detailed deconstruction of the
proposed registry and database.
129. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
130. See discussion infra Part III.A.
131. See supra note 113.
132. The ability of disclosures, education, and counseling to protect consumers from predatory
behavior has been seriously questioned. See McCoy, supra note 21, at 738-39 (noting that the
effectiveness of education and counseling is doubtful due to insufficient funding and staffing, lack of
immediate feedback or opportunities for corrective action, inadequate impact on cognitive anomalies,
and clever and relentless manipulation by predators). The effectiveness of disclosures has been
questioned even by a mortgage brokerage industry representative. Responding to an observation that
borrowers are already signing without reading ten or fifteen pieces of paper at a closing, the
representative for NAMB stated, "I disagree with waivers, whether they be under Truth in Lending
waivers on rescissions, or anything else. I think waivers are very dangerous for consumers and I would
not want to see.., waiver provisions enhanced." Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at
19 (statement of Joseph L. Falk, Chair, Government Affairs Comm., NAMB).
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a. Consumer Counseling and Mandatory Disclosures
The counseling requirements of HR 1295 are set forth in Title 11, which
consists of two subtitles. Subtitle A, Consumer Counseling, addresses exclusively
high-cost lending, while Subtitle B, Expanded Housing Counseling Opportunities,
focuses on an array of housing issues including "mortgage-related counseling
(including home equity conversion mortgages and credit protection options to avoid
foreclosure)."' 33
Subtitle A consists of a single section that would be added to TILA.'34 Section
201 of the bill provides as follows:
(y)(1)... A creditor may not extend any credit in the form of
a higher-cost mortgage to any consumer unless the creditor has
provided to the consumer, at such time before the consummation
of the mortgage and in such manner as the Board shall provide by
regulation-
(A) a separate written statement recommending that the
consumer take advantage of available home ownership or credit
counseling services before agreeing to the terms of any higher-
cost mortgage; and
(B) a written statement containing the names, addresses and
telephone numbers of counseling agencies or programs
reasonably available to the consumer that have been certified or
approved and made publicly available by [HUD], a State housing
finance authority ..., [or other authorized agency] as qualified to
provide counseling on
(1) the advisability of a higher-cost mortgage transaction; and
(ii) the appropriateness of a higher-cost mortgage for the
consumer.
135
This provision is really a disclosure requirement and not a counseling requirement
at all, as the only obligation imposed is to give the consumer one piece of paper that
recommends counseling and a second piece ofpaper that contains counselor contact
information. Subtitle A does not require that the consumer ever actually contact a
credit counselor or ever actually receive any counseling. Thus, like any other
disclosure, a predatory lender or broker can draw on a number of tricks to render
the disclosure ineffective, including marginalizing the form itself, marginalizing the
value of any advice the consumer might receive, claiming that the time required for
counseling would risk an increase in interest rates or even jeopardize the entire
133. H.R. 1295, 109th Cong. § 212 (2005) (proposing a new subsection (g)(3)(A)(ii) to be added
as an amendment to section 4 of the Department of Housing and Urban Development Act).
134. Id. § 201 (proposing to amend section 129 of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)).
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deal, and preying on the consumer's need for funds.'36 Further, like all disclosure
mechanisms, Subtitle A does nothing to address the ability of a broker to
simultaneously encourage a consumer's trust and exploit information and power
asymmetries.
Subtitle B contains a number of education and counseling initiatives,
purportedly created to expand housing opportunities. They include making home
ownership information available via a toll-free telephone number and the
Internet,'37 funding not-for-profit organizations that provide housing counseling,'38
and producing a mortgage information booklet written in "understandable and
accessible" language.3 9 Subtitle B also includes outreach initiatives directed at
"vulnerable populations,"' 40 the very existence of which seems a rejection of the
mortgage lending industry's constant denial of targeting and reverse re-lining.
Evidence of such targeting, especially on the basis of race, has been established by
any number of studies. 4' Finally, Subtitle B delegates to the Secretary the task of
establishing minimum standards for counseling materials and for persons who will
act as counselors.
142
These education and counseling provisions are subject to the same two
criticisms identified above with regard to HR 1994. 4 ' First, the effectiveness of
education and counseling at preventing consumers from becoming victims of a
predatory loan is debatable. Second, these provisions are wrongly focused. It should
not be the obligation of the consumer to take steps to avoid being cheated; it should
be the obligation of the mortgage broker not to cheat. Thus, instead of striving to
educate and counsel consumers so that they can better protect themselves, the goal
should be to address the structural systems that enable predation to occur and the
136. See Wilson, Effecting Responsibility, supra note 44, at 1500-01.
137. H.R. 1295 § 213(a) (proposing a new subsection (h)(2) to be added as an amendment to
section 106 of the Department of Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 (DHUDA)).
138. Id. § 213(a) (proposing a new subsection (h)(6) to be added as an amendment to section 106
of DHUDA).
139. Id. § 218(2) (proposing a new subsection (a) to be added as an amendment to section 5 of
RESPA).
140. Id. § 213(a) (proposing a new subsection (h)(5) to be added as an amendment to section 106
of DHUDA).
141. For studies finding race-based disparity in subprime lending, see ACORN FAIR HOUSING,
THE HIGH COST OF CREDIT: DISPARITIES IN HIGH-PRICED REFINANCE LOANS TO MINORITY
HOMEOWNERS IN 125 AMERICAN CITIES 11-13 (2005), http://acorn.org/fileadmin/Affordable_
Housing/hmdafHigh Cost of Credit Report.doc; see also KEVIN STEIN, CAL. REINVESTMENT COAL.,
WHO REALLY GETS HIGHER-COST HOME LOANS?: HOME LOAN DISPARITIES BY INCOME, RACE AND
ETHNICITY OF BORROWERS AND NEIGHBORHOODS IN 12 CALIFORNIA COMMUNITIES IN 2004 12 16
(2005), http://www.calreinvest.org/system/assets/1 4.pdf; DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, KEITH S. ERNST,
& WEI LI, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY
ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES 2 3 (2006), http:// www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr01 I-
Unfair Lending-0506.pdf; CAL. REINVESTMENT COAL. ET AL., PAYING MORE FOR THE AMERICAN
DREAM (2007), http://www.nedap.org/pressroom/documents/2007_Report-2005_HMDA.pdf. The data
analyzed for these and other studies come from disclosures required by the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801 2810 (2000).
142. H.R. 1295 § 213(a) (proposing a new subsection (h)(1)(A) to be added as an amendment to
section 106 of the DHUDA).
143. See discussion supra Part II.B. 1.
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incentives that entice brokers to commit predatory acts. State experiments with
redefining the broker-consumer relationship attempt to do this; HR 1295 does not.
In addition to education and counseling initiatives, HR 1295 also relies on
disclosures to "protect" consumers. These disclosures, found in Title I of the bill,
purport to fulfill three functions: (1) an informative function that emphasizes
consumer awareness of the terms included in a loan; (2) an empowering function
directed at increasing a consumer's negotiation skills; and (3) a cautionary function
served by providing sobering descriptions of the cost and potential consequences
of a "higher-cost mortgage." An example of an informative disclosure is the
requirement that a creditor disclose the existence, effect, and statutory authority for
a balloon feature in a loan.'44 The principal example of an "empowering" disclosure
is the requirement that the consumer be informed of all "points, fees, or other
charges payable to the creditor or any third party [that] are included, directly or
indirectly, in the principal amount of the loan or otherwise financed by the
creditor."' 45 The value of this disclosure lies, in theory, from the consumer's ability
to use the disclosure to engage in comparison shopping. The cautionary disclosures
appear to be an intensification of the warnings currently found in HOEPA.'4 6 These
disclosures caution the consumer that (1) the interest rate and fees charged for a
subprime market loan are higher than the interest rate and fees charged for a prime
market loan, which results in a higher monthly payment;'4 7 (2) the terms of a
subprime loan and the fees charged for it can vary from broker to broker and that
a consumer's credit score may entitle him or her to a lower cost loan than a broker
might present;'48 (3) a bill consolidation loan may not be in the consumer's best
interest because the "savings" from lower monthly payments on the consolidated
debt may not be recaptured and because the extended repayment term substantially
increases the total amount of payments that will be made on the consolidated
debt; 4 9 and (4) the consumer "may get into serious financial difficulties if [the
consumer] use[s] this loan to pay off old debts and then replace[s] them with other
new debts.' 5 °
Disclosures, standing alone, are inadequate to fill the gaps that exist in the
proscriptive approach to predatory lending, because the disclosure approach itself
is riddled with gaps. A predatory broker can deprive disclosures of the informative
144. Id. § 103(b)(3) (proposing a new subsection (e)(3) to be added as an amendment to section
129 of TILA).
145. Id. § 103(d) (proposing anew subsection (m)(2) to be added as an amendment to section 129
of TILA).
146. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA), Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108
Stat. 2190 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
147. H.R. 1295 § 103(k) (proposing anew subsection (a)(1)(C) to be added as an amendment to
section 129 of T1LA).
148. Id. (proposing a new subsection (a)(1)(D) to be added as an amendment to section 129 of
TILA).
149. Id. (proposing a new subsection (a)(1)(E) to be added as an amendment to section 129 of
TILA).
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and empowering functions intended by sections 103(b), (d), and (k) in several ways.
First, a broker can minimize the impact of a required disclosure simply by burying
it in a stack of documents. For a consumer already overwhelmed by the number and
complexity of documents involved in a real estate mortgage loan, a disclosure form
can become j ust one more document to sign when told. A broker can also minimize
the impact of a disclosure by manipulating the context in which the disclosure is
made-for example, by compressing the time that a consumer is given to read and
comprehend documents or by creating an intimidating atmosphere that dissuades
a consumer from asking questions or pursuing answers, including the use of threats
to terminate the transaction. Additionally, brokers can further minimize the
effectiveness of a disclosure by using nontransparent acronyms, such as "YSP
' '
151
and "POC,,,152 to obfuscate the content of the disclosure.
153
Similarly, a broker can rob the disclosures required by section 103(k) of their
cautionary effect in two ways. First, a broker can marginalize the disclosures by
characterizing them as just another form that "the bureaucrats" require and nothing
that consumers should "trouble" themselves with. Second, a broker can render the
disclosures ineffective by exploiting the psychological factors including
optimism, anchoring, and availability heuristics1 4  that impel a consumer toward
finalization of the loan. Such manipulation should come as no surprise when the
responsibility for conveying disclosures to a consumer is placed in the hands of the
very person who profits most when disclosures are least effective. With the
informative, empowering, and cautionary effects of disclosures so easily diminished
or avoided, disclosures fail to reduce the information and power imbalances
between mortgage brokers and consumers.
A second failing of the disclosure methodology, which it shares with education
and counseling methodologies, is that it is directed at the wrong party. The purpose
of all disclosures is to make the consumer a better bargainer and thus better able to
defend against the tactics of a predatory broker. There is no recognition in the
disclosure approach that the nature of the mortgage broker-consumer relationship
should give rise to duties that place limitations on broker conduct. It is precisely
this recognition that underlies the initiatives in some state broker licensing statutes,
incomplete though they may be, to impose contractual or agency like duties from
151. YSP refers to yield spread premium.
152. POC means paid out of closing.
153. YSPs have been criticized because they are a form of compensation the borrower pays to the
mortgage broker without knowing that the payment is occurring. Wilson, Taxonomic Analysis, supra
note 11, at 329. The compensation is disguised because the payment comes from the lender, but the
borrower is the source ofthe payment by paying an interest rate higher than the lender's predetermined
par rate. Id. I have argued that the YSP compensation system is a form of steering, as the broker is
compensated for convincing a borrower to take a loan with an interest rate higher than that dictated by
the risk of default indicated by the borrower's credit score. Id. If the YSP were knowingly agreed to by
a borrower as a way to get additional funds from a lender to have a "no fee" closing, it would not be so
odious. Unfortunately, YSPs are too often abused and the borrower is uninformed about their effect,
even when "disclosed" on a HUD-1 Settlement Statement. See id. Similarly, the designation POC is
used to disguise a variety of charges that are not explained to or fully understood by borrowers.
154. See Forrester, supra note 89.
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brokers to consumers. 5 Disclosures simply say to a consumer, "It is your job to
avoid being victimized." When disclosures fail to achieve that goal, the fault is
assumed to lie with the consumer, who, according to this view, had all the tools
needed to deal with the broker. The mortgage brokering and lending industry can
thus consider itself absolved of responsibility moral as well as legal for the
damage done to the consumer.156
b. National Database ofLicensed Mortgage Brokers
The proposal for a national database of licensed mortgage brokers is found in
HR 1295 at Subtitle B of Title V. Specifically, section 511 provides that the
"Secretary ... shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a national
database of mortgage brokers.', 15 7 The creation of a national database of mortgage
brokers is something of an advance over the consumer education, counseling, and
disclosure methodologies of consumer protections, as the database includes at least
some notion of broker accountability. Although the database, like education,
counseling, and disclosures, is primarily a consumer self-defense device, it also
gives notice to brokers that predatory behavior is improper and that there will be
consequences-pub icly available information about their predatory behavior-if
they engage in it.1' 8 This benefit is subject, however, to two qualifications. The first
is that the proposal for a national database must be severed from the remainder of
HR 1295. The consumer protection benefits of the database proposed in Title V are
far outweighed by consumer harming provisions found in the remainder of the
bill. 159 The second qualification is that the scope of the database must be
sufficiently broad and the information contained in it must be sufficiently complete
to enable the realization of the "predator avoidance" goal. Achieving this goal is
thus a function of what information is compiled and stored in the database and who
has access to it. Addressing those questions is the task of the remainder of this
subsection.
155. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 4979.5 (West Supp. 2007) ("A person who provides brokerage
services to a borrower in a covered loan transaction by soliciting lenders or otherwise negotiating a
consumer loan secured by real property, is the fiduciary of the consumer .... ").
156. The "blame the consumer" approach is most conspicuous in the disclosure concerning new
debt incurred after taking out abill consolidation loan. When consumers incur new credit card debt after
"paying" the old debt via a debt consolidation loan, the new charges may result from uninsured medical
bills or reduction in income because a good paying job has been lost and replaced by a lower paying
one in the service sector, not from indiscriminate spending.
157. Responsible Lending Act, H.R. 1295, 109th Cong. § 511 (a) (2005).
158. The Minnesota mortgage broker licensing statute contains a similar provision that allows for
publication of a broker's wrongdoing on the state's Department of Commerce web site. See MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 58.12 (West 2002); Minnesota Department of Commerce, Enforcement Actions,
http://www.state.mn.us (follow "State Agencies" hyperlink; then follow "Commerce Department"
hyperlink; then follow "Enforcement Actions" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
159. See discussion supra Part I.C.I 2.
2007]
33
Wilson: Sometime Less Is More: Utility, Preemption, and Hermeneutical Cri
Published by Scholar Commons, 2007
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
i. Universal Inclusion in the Database Unrealized
The operative provisions of Subtitle B of Title V are found in section 512.60
On first reading, section 512(1) appears to require universal inclusion of all
mortgage brokers, as it requires that the national database "include a listing of each
person licensed under State law or regulation or under Federal mortgage broker
requirements under section 502 to act as a mortgage broker."'' A database that is
truly universal could assist consumers by preventing brokers from concealing their
predatory behavior through geographic migration. 16 2 Currently, when conditions in
one locale become too "hot" for a broker, they can relocate to another state and
begin anew. So long as the broker has not acquired a criminal record available
through an FBI records search, which is customarily required by state mortgage
broker licensing statutes, 163 and so long as the broker is willing to lie about the
existence of past predatory activities on a license application, consumers in the new
state will not learn about prior predatory acts. By placing information from all fifty
states into a central clearinghouse, a national database would improve consumers'
ability to identify predatory brokers and avoid doing business with them. Such a
database would also help each state discharge its gatekeeping function by
eliminating the anonymity that enables bad actors to reenter the marketplace.
Further, a universal database would help lenders avoid unknowingly hiring a
predatory broker.
Unfortunately, the potential benefits that could be realized from a national
database are compromised in HR 1295 because the scope of the proposed database
is not universal. The exemptions from the definition of mortgage broker found in
section 501 (b)(2) 164 would produce expansive exclusions from the national database
and render it underinclusive. Furthermore, as this section provides that "the laws
and regulations of a State shall exempt" the same categories of persons as HR 1295,
the underinclusiveness of the database is not limited solely to those brokers who
would be subject to the bill's federal minimum standards. 165 In fact, this definitional
preemption renders meaningless the distinction made in section 512(1) between
brokers licensed "under state law or regulation" and brokers licensed "under
160. H.R. 1295 § 512.
161. Id. § 512(1).
162. See Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 55 (statement of Joseph L. Falk,
Chair, Government Affairs Comm., NAMB).
163. For examples of lender applications requiring consent to federal criminal background checks,
see Commonwealth of Kentucky Office of Financial Institutions, Forms and Applications, http://www.
kfi.ky.gov/industryinfo/formsapps.htm (follow "Criminal Background Check Requirements" hyperlink)
(last visited Sept. 16, 2007); North Carolina Comm'r of Banks, NC Mortgage Lending & Licensing
Compliance Forms, http://www.nccob.org/NCCOB/Mortgage/FormsFees/ (follow"M LA0I" hyperlink)
(last visited Sept. 16, 2007); Vermont Department of Banking, Insurance, Securities & Health Care
Administration, Authority to Release Information, http://www.bishca.state.vt.us/BankingDiv
/lenderapplic/Authtorelease.PDF (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
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Federal mortgage broker requirements."' 66 With regard to regulation of persons who
are to be included in the database by virtue of licensure under state or federal law,
the two groups are rendered coextensive.
The database proposed in HR 1295 is further underinclusive because it fails to
address a second means by which a predatory broker can avoid
detection regulatory migration.' 6 7 Regulatory migration takes place when a broker
moves from a setting where regulation and licensing occur at the individual level
to a setting where regulation occurs at the institutional level with no individual
license, or vice versa. If regulation is at the institutional level, an independent
broker who takes a job with a mortgage bank will not be subject to a personal
history and business background check by the state that would uncover predatory
acts the broker had previously committed. Similarly, a broker whose employment
by a mortgage banking company was terminated because of predatory behavior
could apply for an independent broker's license with little fear that prior predatory
acts would become known. Because of privacy rights and concerns about potential
liability, employers are notoriously reluctant to release information about former
employees.
A significant amount of testimony given at the Licensing Hearing by
representatives of NAMB and MBA concerned the level at which registration
should occur. The mortgage banking industry representative argued in favor of
institutional-level licensing and against individual level licensing of employees who
broker loans.'6 8 According to this representative, individual-level licensing is
unnecessary for two reasons: mortgage bankers are already subject to extensive
regulation and they bear the risk of financial loss from loan defaults that result from
predatory activities. 6 9 Mortgage bankers assert that the risk of loss, which they
emphasize mortgage brokers do not have, is all that is needed to ensure that they
will vigorously investigate the backgrounds of persons applying for employment. 
70
In short, the mortgage bankers contend that industry self-interest and self-policing
fulfill the same gatekeeping function as the individual-level licensing required for
mortgage brokers. The mortgage brokering industry representative argued equally
vehemently in favor of individual level licensing for both groups. 17 ' Although
undoubtedly one reason for the mortgage brokers' position is preservation of
competitive parity with mortgage bankers regarding compliance obligations and
166. Id. § 512(1). Section 501 (a) states that the federal mortgage broker requirements "shall apply
only" to states that have not enacted the laws and regulations described in subsection (b). Id. § 501(a).
The exemptions from the definition of mortgage broker in section 501(b)(2), on the other hand, are
binding on all states, which means that the federal definition and the states' definition of a mortgage
broker will be identical. Id. § 501(b)(2).
167. See Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 55 (statement of Joseph L. Falk,
Chair, Government Affairs Comm., NAMB).
168. Id. at 7, 45-46 (statement of Teresa A. Bryce, Senior Vice President and Director of Legal
and Corporate Affairs, Nexstar Financial Corporation).
169. See id. at 44, 46.
170. See id.
171. Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 8-9, 52 (statement of Joseph L. Falk,
Chair, Government Affairs Comm., NAMB).
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costs, a more civic orientedjustification offered by the brokers' representative was
protecting consumers by preventing regulatory migration." 2
If institutional level licensing is permitted, many loan brokers will not be
"licensed under State law or regulation or under Federal mortgage broker
requirements" and thus would not be included in the national database.'73 Once
again, the underinclusiveness of the database would inhibit its value to consumers,
compromise each state's gatekeeping efforts, and be of little service to subsequent
employers.
ii. Intended Users and Uses of Information in the
Database- Unclear
Section 512 establishes four categories of persons or groups entitled to access
information in the database and determines the types of information that will be
made available to those persons or groups. 4 Implicit in these differentiations are
decisions that seek to balance the benefits of making information about mortgage
brokers available to users of the database with mortgage brokers' concerns about
privacy and unfounded or disputed claims. In principle, accommodating these
interests is necessary; whether the accommodation proposed in HR 1295 achieves
a reasonable balance of competing interests is debatable.
The database user identified in section 512(2) is the public at large.
17 5
Information that shall be made available to the public consists of "complaints made,
and final disciplinary and enforcement actions taken, against each licensed
mortgage broker."' 76 Unsurprisingly, mortgage brokers object to the publication of
"complaints made" on the ground that an untested complaint could contain
unfounded allegations. NAMB argues that the database should disclose information
about final disciplinary and enforcement actions only. 7 That approach is too
restrictive, however, as it would exclude all complaints that were terminated in any
manner short of a final action. A negotiated settlement, for example, could be
structured to include a withdrawal of the consumer's complaint, which would not
result in a final disciplinary or enforcement action. A state regulator could, of
course, continue with an administrative action, but with a placated consumer and
limited public resources, that course of action is unlikely. If the database is to fulfill
its consumer informing and cautioning function, it must include "complaints
made."' 78 Where there is no final adjudicated decision, broker denials of
wrongdoing could be included in the database, much as consumers can dispute
adverse entries on a credit report. Consumers can then decide whether to work with
172. Id. at 8 9.
173. H.R. 1295, 109th Cong. § 512(1) (2005).
174. Id. § 512(2)-(5).
175. Id. § 512(2).
176. Id.
177. See Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 55 (statement of Joseph L. Falk,
Chair, Government Affairs Comm., NAMB) (arguing that the national database should include only
"substantiated claim[s]" that are "fully adjudicated by the proper governmental entity").
178. H.R. 1295 § 512(2).
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or avoid a broker based on several factors, including the number of complaints
disclosed and the persuasiveness of the broker's denial of wrongdoing.
Although the inclusion of complaints made is good for consumers, the intended
scope of that term is not clearly established and could be construed in a way that
would unduly hinder the bill's informative and cautionary goals. The language,
complaints made, and final disciplinary and enforcement actions taken, sounds as
if the only matters included are administrative proceedings conducted by the state
agency that involve a violation of the state's broker licensing statute. While
administrative proceedings are clearly important to a consumer's decisionmaking
process, they are not the only relevant proceedings. Judicial proceedings, which
result in ajudgment as opposed to a disciplinary action, are also obviously relevant.
Further, complaints of wrongdoing other than violation ofa licensing statute should
be disclosed to consumers. Many states require applicants for a broker's license to
disclose all felony charges of every nature, all misdemeanor charges involving
financial matters, and all bankruptcy proceedings, precisely because those matters
are deemed relevant to the state's evaluation of the applicant's trustworthiness.'79
That information is similarly relevant to a consumer's evaluation. It would be
appropriate for section 512(2) to include some limits on the types of administrative
and judicial proceedings that must be disclosed, and the length of time that the
proceedings remain relevant, but as written section 512(2) is too restrictive.
The database users identified in section 512(3) are the Secretary and state
agencies and officials who are responsible for licensing or testing mortgage
brokers.' Under this section, the database shall make available to the Secretary,
and state agencies and officials "such information regarding mortgage brokers as
the Secretary, by regulation, considers appropriate for the Secretary and such
agencies and officials to carry out their functions regarding regulation, licensing,
or testing of mortgage brokers, including information regarding employment
histories and criminal backgrounds of mortgage brokers."'' The nature of
"appropriate" information is left unspecified, except with regard to two items:
"employment histories and criminal backgrounds."' 1 2 As these two items raise
different concerns, they should be treated differently with regard to the disclosure
of information from the database.
The treatment of criminal background information was considered in the
analysis of section 512(2)."3 Criminal history that is relevant to a broker's
trustworthiness in financial matters, and not stale due to passage of time, should not
be restricted to the Secretary and officials of state agencies. NAMB representatives
repeatedly emphasize the importance of mortgage financing to consumers and the
179. See supra note 163.
180. H.R. 1295 § 512(3).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 175 79 and accompanying text.
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critical role brokers play in the financing process.'84 Such statements support
including information about a broker's criminal history in the general public
category of section 512(2), in addition to the regulator category of section 512(3).
Inclusion in section 512(2) would promote the consumer information and
cautionary functions; inclusion in section 512(3) would promote the government's
gatekeeping function, especially in regard to geographic migration. In light ofthese
interests, brokers cannot plausibly argue that information about their criminal
history is unreliable or a private matter.
The restriction of a mortgage broker's employment history to the Secretary and
state regulators is more problematic. Both regulators and consumers have an
interest in a broker's employment history because of the adverse information that
might be discovered. The fact that a broker was discharged from employment
because of engagement in predatory activities or other financial malfeasance is
undeniably relevant to a consumer's decision to work with or avoid a broker. That
information is also undeniably relevant to a regulator's gatekeeping function.
Nevertheless, there are valid concerns about privacy and reliability that justify
restricting employment information to the Secretary and state regulators.
Perhaps the most persuasive reason for restricting public access to employment
information is that the information may not be fully reliable. The grounds for an
adverse employment action are often multifaceted and disputed. Further,
employment related decisions, when memorialized in employment files, are often
couched in deliberately generic and uninformative terms. This unreliability has two
related outcomes. First, it lends credence to a broker's interest in limiting access to
potentially ambiguous and incomplete, yet damaging, information. Second, this
unreliability means that the informative and cautionary benefits to consumers are
low. Unlike consumers, the Secretary and state regulators can be expected to and
are bound to-maintain the confidentiality of a broker's employment records. Thus,
the restriction of employment information to the Secretary and state regulators is
appropriate.
The database users identified in section 512(4) are "persons employing or using
the services of mortgage brokers."' 85 Little can be said about the substance of this
section because it does not describe the nature of the information that would be
made available to the intended users. This section merely states that the database
shall make available "such information regarding mortgage brokers as the
Secretary, by regulation, considers appropriate."' 8 6 The scope of persons who are
184. See Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 51 (statement of Joseph L. Falk,
Chair, Government Affairs Comm., NAMB) ("[Mortgage brokers] guide consumers through the
mortgage loan origination process [and] work closely with consumers throughout the homebuying and
ownership process."). For an uncharacteristically candid statement of the responsibility mortgage
brokers should owe to consumers as a result of the close relationship brokers seek, see Howard
Schneider, Walking a Tightrope, NAT'L MORTGAGE BROKER MAG., July 2006, at 1, 1, available at
http://www.nationalmortgagebroker.com/index.php?pid-magazine&cid=02 ("Education, borrower
needs, financial capabilities [have] becom[e] important skills to cultivate in what once was seen purely
as a sales business.").
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to have access to whatever information is determined to be "appropriate" does,
however, merit discussion. The meaning of the words employing or using is not
transparent. Employing could refer to the W-2 type relationship that would exist
between a lender and an in-house worker or to the relationship that would exist
between a lender and an independent mortgage broker through whom a lender
makes its loan products available to consumers. Employing could also refer to the
relationship that arises when a consumer engages a mortgage broker to locate a
loan. This latter possibility is made even more credible by the fact that section
512(4) also applies to persons "using the services of' a mortgage broker.'87
Despite the ambiguity, it is unlikely that section 512(4) intends to include, or
should be taken to include, consumers within the class of intended users for two
reasons. First, as members of the general public, consumers are already included in
section 512(2).188 Although the set of consumers who "use" the services of a
mortgage broker is smaller than the set of all consumers, if the goal of section
512(2) is to inform and caution consumers about predatory brokers-if it is directed
at members of the public who are planning to use a mortgage broker-then the use
distinction loses much, if not all, of its meaning. Thus, it is inconsistent with the
categorical arrangement of the subparts of section 512 to include consumers twice.
Second, the various subparts of section 512 appear to be designed to address
the information needs of, and disclosure concerns relating to, the principal
categories of persons or groups who have an interest in acquiring information about
mortgage brokers. These persons and groups are consumers in the general public,
government regulators, and lenders that work with brokers."8 9 The first two
categories line up with the scope of sections 512(2) and 512(3), and this pattern
suggests that the lenders are covered by 512(4). While the scope of 512(4) should
be stated with greater clarity, a reasonable reading is that the section is intended to
provide information that would help a lender avoid employing a predatory broker
as an in-house employee or using the services of a predatory broker as an
independent agent.190
Section 512(5), the final subsection, is completely unspecific and open-ended.
It provides only that the database shall "provide for the maintenance of such other
information as the Secretary considers appropriate."' 9 Apparently, the Secretary
will have the discretion to decide not only what information will be maintained but
also who will have access to it. With no information about the identity of intended
users or the nature of included information, it is impossible to determine whether
section 512(5) allows the Secretary to identify additional types of information that
can be made available to the established categories of database users or whether the
Secretary is empowered to create entirely new categories.
One observation that can be made about the yet-to-be-determined content of
section 512(5) is that it recalls the requirement of section 511 (b) that the Secretary
187. Id.
188. Id. § 512(2).
189. Id. § 512(2)-(4).
190. Id. § 512(4).
191. Id. § 512(5).
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shall "consult with the American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators
[(AARMR)], the Conference of State Bank Supervisors [(CSBS)], and other
appropriate organizations in determining the information to be maintained in the
database."' 92 Requiring the Secretary to consult with the CSBS and the AARMR
is a generally positive development for consumers. 93 At the same time, however,
it is worth noting that in determining the content of section 512(5), the Secretary
need not consult with consumers or with consumer advocacy groups. 94 As the
identity of "other appropriate organizations" is apparently left to the Secretary's
discretion, 195 one can be justifiably skeptical that consumer participation will be
significant, if permitted at all.
A far more preferable model for the makeup of a consulting group can be found
in the Predatory Lending Advisory Council, proposed in House Bill 200.196 Of the
thirteen members of this Council, four members are to be representatives of
community-based organizations, three are to be representatives of state agencies for
consumer affairs or consumer protection, three are to be private homeowners, and
three are to be representatives of the private real estate industry, "such as realtors,
mortgage brokers, and bankers."' 97 This composition need not be copied exactly,
but section 51 l(b) 98 should require that the Secretary consult with advisors who
represent a diversity of interests and should even be weighted in favor of including
voices that do not otherwise have access, either through lobbying or personal
contacts, to decisionmakers in the government.
iii. An Alternative to the National Database ofMortgage Brokers
of HR 1295
A national database that achieves universal inclusion of all mortgage brokers
in all states and does not unduly restrict the information consumers can access
about brokers would be a useful tool for combating predatory lending. Such a
database has the potential to (1) help consumers identify and avoid doing business
with brokers who exhibit predatory tendencies; (2) help state regulators carry out
the gatekeeping function of mortgage broker licensing statutes by preventing
predators from entering the mortgage brokering business; and (3) help
192. Id. § 511(b).
193. See Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 97 (statement of Joseph A. Smith,
Jr., North Carolina Conm'r of Banks, CSBS). Smith astutely recognized that while "changes in
technology and deregulation make financing.., loans a global industry," residential mortgage lending
"is a local activity," and "[t]he damage done by predatory lending and mortgage fraud.., is... local."
Id. In response to the question about whether "a uniform standard be a minimum standard,.., a 'floor'
or a 'ceiling'," Smith replied, "Since borrowers' needs may vary widely from one state to another,
uniform standards should be the floor, rather than the ceiling, for the mortgage industry." Id at 102.
194. See H.R. 1295 § 512(5).
195. Id. § 511(b).
196. Prevention of Predatory Lending Through Education Act (PPLTEA), H.R. 200, 109th Cong.
§ 5(a) (2005).
197. Id. § 5(b)(1)-(4).
198. H.R. 1295 § 511(b).
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conscientious lenders avoid hiring or doing business with predatory brokers.
Unfortunately, HR 1295 does not achieve these goals. The broad exclusions from
the definition of mortgage broker render the scope of the database far from
universal, and the restriction of a broker's criminal history to regulators denies
consumers the use of important information relevant to their choice of a broker.
Finally, the modest benefits conferred by the database that would be created by HR
1295 are overshadowed by the scaling back of substantive consumer protections
produced by other titles of the bill. 199
A further reason to reject the national database proposed in HR 1295 is that a
similar proposal is being developed by CSBS and AARMR.2 °° One immediate
advantage of the database proposed by CSBS and AARMR over the HR 1295
database is that the former will include all mortgage brokers required to be licensed
under state law.20' Because the CSBS AARMR proposal does not impose an
artificially narrow definition of mortgage broker, its coverage will achieve a
significantly greater degree of inclusiveness. 2 2 Additionally, because the
CSBS-AARMR database originates from state regulators, it does not raise the
preemption concerns that pervade HR 1295.2°3
Finally, by its reliance on education, counseling, disclosures, and a database,
HR 1295 fails to critically examine the nature of the mortgage broker-consumer
relationship, including the inculcation of a sense of trust, virtually insurmountable
asymmetries in information and power, and the disconnect between expectations
about applicable legal duties and doctrinal reality. For this reason, HR 1295 is
inferior to state mortgage broker licensing statutes that at least experiment with
alternative ways to view the broker-consumer relationship. Such experiments are
to be valued, not discouraged or preempted, because redefining of the mortgage
broker-consumer relationship is necessary to fill in the gaps inherent in other
antipredatory lending strategies.
111. PREEMPTION AND HERMENEUTICAL CRITICISMS OF PROPOSED FEDERAL
REGULATION OF MORTGAGE BROKERS
At the Licensing Hearing, Housing and Community Subcommittee Chairman
Robert Ney proclaimed multiple times that title V of HR 1295 was intended to
establish "a floor.., but not [a] ceiling" and did not preempt state laws with regard
to education and licensing requirements for mortgage brokers.20 4 Representative
Ney even professed his inability to comprehend how one witness who raised
199. See discussion supra Part II.C.1 3.a.
200. Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 103 04 (statement of Joseph A. Smith,
Jr., North Carolina Comm'r of Banks, CSBS).
201. Id. at 104 (clarifying that the proposed database would include "all individuals and
companies currently required to be licensed or registered under state law").
202. See id. at 103.
203. See discussion infra Part III.A.
204. Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra, note 5, at 2 (statement of the Honorable Robert
Ney, Chair, H. Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity).
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preemption concerns could so misread the bill.2 °5 In fact, the witness's intuition was
insightful and Representative Ney's comments were disingenuous. To claim that
HR 1295 does not preempt state regulation of mortgage brokers requires an
intentional disregard of the exemptions from regulation granted in Title V and of
the inescapable interconnection between the remedial provisions in Title I and
regulation of broker conduct. Section A of this Part will demonstrate the
preemption accomplished by HR 1295.
Also in connection with the preemption issue, section B of this Part considers
the hermeneutical bias on which federal preemption is grounded, raises some
ethical concerns that follow from it, and closes by noting the influence of that bias
on legislative responses to predatory lending.
A. Preemption of State Regulation of Mortgage Brokers in Titles I and V of
HR 1295
Initially it appears that HR 1295 allows states to enact mortgage broker
regulations that are more restrictive than the bill establishes. The title to Subtitle A
refers to "[m]inimum [s]tandards,""2 6 and section 501(a) states that the federal
requirements "shall apply only with respect to States that... have not enacted and
do not have in effect [the] uniform State laws and regulations described in
subsection (b)."2 7 Thus, one would think that HR 1295 would have no effect on
states that have enacted laws that meet or exceed the regulations prescribed in
section 50 1(b). That conclusion would be wrong.
The preemptive effect of Title V originates in section 501 (b)(2), which defines
the term mortgage broker and declares that "the laws and regulations of a State
shall exempt [certain categories of persons and organizations] from treatment as
mortgage brokers. 20 8 The exemptions of section 501(b)(2) would impact every
aspect of mortgage broker regulation by the states. If a person fits within one of
those exemptions, states would be precluded from imposing any kind of regulatory
requirements. States could not subject that person to background investigations or
any other of the gatekeeping mechanisms; states could not impose a bonding
requirement, impose sanctions for misconduct, or utilize any other administrative
oversight mechanism; and states could not create contract- or agency-based duties
in favor of consumers. It is difficult to imagine a preemptive tool more basic than
the power to define whom the states can, and cannot, subject to regulation.
The preemptive effect of Title I is further displayed when the provisions of that
title are read with attention to their connection to state licensing of mortgage
brokers. Title I appears to focus on the regulation of terms and practices associated
205. Id. The incredulity was directed at Daniel F. Hedges, Director, Mountain State Justice, Inc.
As I hope the discussion of stealth preemption in this Article makes clear, Mr. Hedges's concerns were
insightful and meritorious.
206. Responsible Lending Act, H.R. 1295, 109th Cong. tit. V, subtit. B (2005).
207. Id. § 501(a).
208. Id. § 501(b)(2).
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with "higher-cost mortgages"2 °9 rather than on mortgage brokers, who are the
subject of Title V. 210 Any such compartmentalization is artificial and masks the
preemptive effect that Title I would have on state regulation of mortgage brokers.
The controlling provision in Title I with regard to federal preemption of state
power to regulate mortgage brokers is section 106, which is entitled "Coordination
with State Law.""' Coordination must be understood as a euphemism for
subordination, as the preemptive effect of section 106(1) is clearly stated: "The
provisions of this title shall supersede any provision of the law of any State to the
extent that such provision of law attempts, directly or indirectly, to regulate, or has
the effect of regulating, mortgage lending activities ....,,22 The term "mortgage
lending activities" is defined in section 106(1) to include nearly every conceivable
activity "by or on behalf of a broker,, 213 and the term "law of any State" is defined
so as to capture every form of law that might be enacted by any state or any of its
political subdivisions.2 4 In an uncharacteristically forthright admission, section
106(1) states that its preemptive effect applies "without respect to whether or the
extent to which such provision of [state] law may afford greater protection,
substantive or otherwise, to consumers.
215
Section 106(1) also purports to establish exclusions from the preemptive effect
of all the added sections, including an exemption for "[a]ny law of any State
requiring the licensing, registration, or authorization of any person engaged in
mortgage-lending activities.,, 216 However, this exemption itself contains an
exception, which provides that "the law of any State will be preempted to the extent
that such law conditions the issuance or maintenance of such a license, registration
209. Id. tit. 1. HR 1295 contains a subtle change in the name applied to predatory loans made in
the subprime market. Such loans are generally called "high-cost" loans. See, e.g., Prohibit Predatory
Lending Act, H.R. 1182, 109th Cong. § 2(a) (2005) (proposing a new subsection (aa) to be added as an
amendment to section 103 of TILA that would define the term "[h]igh-[c]ost [m]ortgage"); Fair and
Responsible Lending Act, H.R. 4471, 109th Cong. § 102(a) (2005) (proposing a new subsection (aa)
to section 103 of TILA that would define the term "[h]igh-[c]ost [h]ome loan"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 360.100(1) (LexisNexis 2006 Supp.) (listing the types oftransactions that qualify as "high-cost home
loans"). The use of the term "higher-cost loan" implies that the loan cost is not high as a categorical
matter but is only comparatively high; furthermore, the term implies that the loan is high in comparison
to other loans only because of the borrower's credit history. In other words, the loans are higher-cost
because of risk-based pricing. The cost of predatory loans is set by what the predator can convince,
coerce, or compel a consumer to pay, and predatory tools like steering, YSPs, and inexplicable
origination fees establish that pricing in predatory loans is opportunistic, not risk based. The implication
in the use of the phrase "highcr-cost" loans in HR 1295 should be opposed.
210. H.R. 1295 § 501 515.
211. H.R. 1295 § 106.
212. Id. at §106(1) (proposing a new subsection (f)(1) to be added as an amendment to section
111 of TILA).
213. Id. (proposing a new subsection (t)(2)(A) to be added as an amendment to section 111 of
TILA).
214. Id. (proposing a new subsection (f)(2)(B) to be added as an amendment to section 111 of
TILA).
215. Id. (proposing a new subsection (f)(1)(B) to be added as an amendment to section 111 of
TILA).
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or other authorization, or the authority granted thereby, on compliance with any law
that is otherwise preempted."' Given the extremely comprehensive nature of the
activities that are expressly "otherwise preempted" by Title 1,218 it is unlikely that
any exempted activity would have much regulatory importance.
Section 106(1) also removes private causes of action from a state's regulatory
options by declaring that the provisions of Title I shall supersede state laws that
attempt to regulate mortgage lending activities "by making any conduct in
connection with any such activities subject to civil or criminal penalties.,
219
Similarly, the section removes public civil sanctions by preempting the regulatory
oversight mechanisms of license suspension, revocation, or nonrenewal. Just as the
preemptive definition of mortgage broker in Title V negates a state's ability to
regulate mortgage brokers through the gatekeeping mechanisms of licensing
statutes, the preemptive definition of mortgage lending activities in Title I negates
a state's ability to regulate brokers through administrative oversight mechanisms.
Preemption of state regulation over mortgage brokers is necessary for HR 1295
to protect the bill's many lender and broker protection provisions from erosion by
state law. Examples of provisions in Title I that consumer advocates would
certainly bring to the attention of state legislatures, if that option were not
precluded, include the following provisions: (1) a safe harbor against claims of
asset-based lending that utilizes a lenient presumption of "payment ability"; 220 (2)
a safe harbor against claims of loan flipping that utilizes a lenient definition of
"reasonable tangible benefit to the consumer, '221 which is supplemented by a
generous "rule of construction"; 22
2 (3) a safe harbor against claims of steering;
22
(4) a limitation on the recovery of legal fees for loan flipping;224 (5) a cap on
damages that can be awarded in a class action lawsuit2 5 and a requirement that
predatory "pattern[s] and practice[s] were willful"; 226 and (6) reinforcement of the
holder-in-due course defense for assignees of higher-cost mortgages, 227 including
a generous presumption of due diligence and a limitation of damages. 228 These
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. (proposing a new subsection (f)(1)(A)(ii) to be added as an amendment to section 111
of TILA).
220. Id. § 103(g) (proposing an amendment to section 129(h) of TILA).
221. Id. § 103(i) (proposing a new subsection (r)(2) to be added as an amendment to section 129
of TILA, listing nine situations that would qualify the mortgage as one having such a benefit).
222. Id. (proposing a new subsection (r)(5) to be added as an amendment to section 129 of TILA).
The rule creates a presumption that there has not been a violation of the law, even in the absence of any
of the nine situations. See supra note 221.
223. Id. § 103(r) (proposing a new subsection (x)(2)(B) to be added as an amendment to section
129 of TILA).
224. Id. § 103 (i) (proposing a new subsection (r)(6) to be added as an amendment to section 129
of TILA, prohibiting recovery of legal fees if a "reasonable offer to remedy the violation" was made
and refused).
225. Id. § 105(b) (proposing anew subsection (j)(1) to be added as an amendment to section 130
of TILA).
226. Id. (proposing anew subsection (j)(2) to be added as an amendment to section 130 ofTI LA).
227. See id. § 105(e)(2)(B) (proposing an amendment to section 131 (d)(1)(A) ofTILA).
228. See id. (proposing an amendment to section 131(d)(l)(C) (2) of TILA).
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substantive provisions impact state mortgage broker licensing statutes by insulating
brokers from claims that could otherwise be used to trigger license suspension,
revocation, or nonrenewal, from the imposition of administrative remedies, and
from a private right of action by a consumer against a surety bond. These direct
impacts belie the claim that the licensing and the "minimum" standards of Title V
merely establish a floor and not a ceiling.229
B. Hermeneutical Bias and Proposals for Federal Regulation of Mortgage
Brokers
Part 11 of this Article called attention to the functional limitations inherent in
education, counseling, and mandatory disclosures as methodologies for combating
predatory lending. These methodologies are examined here again to call attention
to the conceptual limitations that flow from a hermeneutical bias and accompanying
anthropology. The first limitation is that the concepts of personal autonomy and
free will inherent in the liberal hermeneutics restricts the types of responses to
predatory lending that are considered "proper." This, in turn, precludes mortgage
lending and brokering advocates and too many legislators from recognizing the
viability of other regulatory proposals, including changes to the legal concept of the
mortgage broker-consumer relationship. Second, the conclusive status currently
afforded to the liberal hermeneutics sends undesirable ethical signals to mortgage
brokers and validates behaviors that harm too many consumers. As one's way of
seeing the world is not neutral, the hermeneutics's influence on mortgage brokers
and the resulting consumer harm are connected. Indeed, as ethicists have pointed
out, "[o]ur seeing shapes our way of being,"23 and "our epistemology is quietly
transformed into our ethic. '23' So long as brokers are free to hide behind the shields
of individual ism, autonomy, and will theory, the ethical dimension oftheir behavior
need not be identified or called into the public debate. This hermeneutical bias is
an additional reason to oppose the current federal proposals to regulate mortgage
brokers.
Many mortgage lending industry participants favor uniform federal regulation
that would eliminate the "patchwork" of state laws they see as imposing
inconsistent and ill-conceived substantive limitations on loan terms and
procedures. 232 The mortgage industry values uniform laws because they promote
efficiency by reducing compliance burdens and costs. 23 Lending industry advocates
229. Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of the Honorable Robert
Ney, Chair, H. Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity).
230. PALMER, supra note 23, at xi.
231. Id. at 21.
232. Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 7 (statement of Teresa A. Bryce, Senior
Vice President and Director ofLegal and Corporate Affairs, Nexstar Financial Corporation) (noting the
"particularly burdensome" nature of state-level licensing of mortgage banking companies and the
absence of"reciprocity provisions" among state regulators).
233. See id. ("[N]ew [s]tate requirements raise the cost of mortgage originations and threaten to
dampen competition and innovation of mortgage markets within [s]tates.").
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have long threatened that failure to achieve this efficiency will increase the cost of
credit, result in credit rationing, or both.234
It is here that the mortgage lending industry's hermeneutical bias can be
detected. The first aspect of that bias is the presence of an embedded warrant 2 5 that
efficient distribution of credit is an ultimate value. The second aspect is acceptance
of an anthropology that depends on highly questionable assumptions about human
behavior. Both assumptions require critical evaluation.
Mortgage lending industry representatives and advocates often support their
call for uniform laws by pointing to modern developments affecting financial
services.236 "Efficient" laws are required to accommodate nationwide lenders who
utilize centralized call centers and the Internet to make loans on a nationwide basis
and to accommodate the national and international sources of capital that fund those
loans.237 Lending industry advocates portray nonuniform state regulation as being
as obsolete and outdated, and they invoke efficiency as the final word.238 In other
words, transactional efficiency becomes "prescriptive and normative,"2 9 instead of
informative.240
"Efficiency" should have no such talismanic power. First, it can be argued that
efficiency is not a value at all. It may be a means to some end that is a value, but
standing alone efficiency is indeterminate. Efficiency in credit availability must
therefore be compared with other efficiencies, such as the efficient protection of
consumers, neighborhoods, and cities from the damage done by predatory lenders
and brokers. In 2000, Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller, in testimony before
hearings convened by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, perceived the derivative nature of efficiency in his statement that "[d]rying
234. Id.; see also id, supra note 5, at 51 (statement of Joseph L. Falk, Chair, Government Affairs
Comm., NAMB) ("[Falk discussed] the need for, and impact of, national minimum licensing
... standards ... to assist in combating abusive lending.").
235. See WAYNE C. BOOTH ET AL., THE CRAFT OF RESEARCH 120 (2d ed. 2003) (explaining that
a warrant is an idea that a person assumes to be so basic, so indisputable, and so pervasively accepted
that one need not bother to state that ideal expressly).
236. Licensing & Registration Hearing, supra note 5, at 45-46 (statement of Teresa A. Bryce,
Senior Vice President and Director of Legal and Corporate Affairs, Nexstar Financial Corporation)
(stating that some states require mortgage companies to maintain an "employee or branch physically
in the state[,] ... [which] may unduly restrict lenders who centralize applications in a call center or
utilize technologies such as the [l]ntemet").
237. Id.
238. Id. at 46 ("[State laws] are being promulgated with an out-dated view of mortgage
origination process and do not recognize the various channels today's sophisticated residential real
estate finance system has available to it in transferring national and international capital to homebuyers
anywhere in the country").
239. See Sargent, supra note 18, at 35.
240. See id. at 54 ("Law and economics[']... expansive and exclusionist prescriptive claims for
how society and the economy should operate largely collapse because its value-neutrality, indifference
to ends, and radical individualism provides no insight into what is required for the happiness in which
humans can truly flourish.").
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up productive credit would be of grave concern; drying up destructive credit is
sound economic and public policy.
' 241
Additionally, the mortgage lending industry's assertion that nonuniform laws
regulating mortgage lending must be eliminated to preserve credit availability and
"low cost '242 is not supported by experience. Empirical studies do not establish a
reduction in credit availability because of state regulation. 243 As for maintaining the
low cost of subprime loans, the prevalence of steering and of nonrisk-based loan
pricing undercuts any claim that loans currently being offered are low cost.
Furthermore, even if one were to accept merely for the sake of argument that
nonuniform regulation would have some negative effect on credit availability or
price, that effect must be compared with the benefit of reducing the harmful
outcomes of predatory lending.
The most obvious effect of promoting the availability of "bad credit" via
predatory loans is the personal loss, both economic and noneconomic, experienced
by consumers. At a minimum, the economic losses include the stripping of equity
that took years to accumulate.244 All too frequently, these economic losses also
include foreclosure and personal bankruptcy, both of which are at record levels.
245
However, economic loss isjust the beginning of the destructive effects of predatory
loans, as individuals also incur a variety of noneconomic losses. Loss of one's
home has psychological effects on individuals and families. Loss of one's home
also involves exclusion from the American dream of home ownership, which for
many is the most direct means of accumulating wealth and entering the middle
241. Predatory Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Responses: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 54 (2001) (statement of the Honorable
Thomas J. Miller, Att'y Gen. of Iowa).
242. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
243. See ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., CTR. FOR COMTY. CAPITALISM, THE IMPACT OF NORTH
CAROLINA'S ANTI-PREDATORY LAW: A DESCRIPTIVE ASSESSMENT 1 (2003), http://www.planning.
unc.edu/pdf/CC NC Anti Predatory Law lmpact.pdf (finding no change in the cost of "subprime
credit"); KEITH ERNST ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, NORTH CAROLINA'S SUBPRIME HOME
LOAN MARKET AFTER PREDATORY LENDING REFORM iii (2002), http://www.responsiblelending.
org/pdfs/HMDA Study on NC Market.pdf (finding that subprime lending is "thriv[ing]" in North
Carolina).
244. ERIC STEIN, COAL. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF
PREDATORY LENDING 2 (2001), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/QuantI 0-01 .pdf (estimating
that "U.S. borrowers lose $9.1 billion annually to predatory lending practices").
245. U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Statistics, http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/bankruptcy
statistics.htm (follow "calendar year" hyperlink then follow "2004-2005 calendar year comparison"
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 17, 2007); Press Release, RealtyTrac, National Foreclosures Increase in
Every Quarter of 2005 According to RealtyTrac U.S. Foreclosure Market Report (Jan. 23, 2006),
http://www.realtytrac.com/news/press/pressrelease.asp?pressreleaselD-86 (announcing areport"which
showed that 846,982 properties nationwide entered some stage of foreclosure in 2005, and a 25 percent
increase in the number of new foreclosures from the first quarter to the fourth quarter"). RealtyTrac
recently announced that foreclosures in September 2007 were "up 99% from the number reported in
September 2006." Press Release, RealtyTrac, Foreclosure Activity Decreases 8 Percent in September
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class.246 The loss of one's home not only requires relocation to another dwelling but
may also require one's children to change school districts. Further, older consumers
face the trauma of losing the home in which they have lived for decades.
In addition to personal losses, promoting the availability of credit on predatory
terms also produces social losses. An individual consumer's loss of a home
becomes a neighborhood loss, as foreclosed homes decrease the surrounding
homes' property values. Foreclosed homes, often remaining unoccupied for
extended periods of time, also become community losses, as they become targets
of vandalism and criminal activity, frustrating neighborhood revitalization
efforts.24 Furthermore, foreclosed homes decrease the community tax base.248 The
effect of decreased tax revenues is aggravated by accompanying increases in
expenditures required for public safety services to neighborhoods and for social
services provided to former homeowners as a result of their displacement. These
"externalities" of predatory lending,249 which are not external at all, are too often
conveniently disregarded by proponents of lax regulation.
Another aspect underlying the argument in favor of minimal regulation is that
the consumer's interests indeed, society's interests are maximized if each
consumer is able to decide individually whether a proposed loan is good or bad,
suitable or unsuitable. This premise assumes that the parties to any exchange act
rationally in their pursuit of maximum personal utility. The rational actor model
produces an anthropology often summarized in the term homo economicus. 2 5° To
the extent that this anthropological assumption is invalid, especially in the subprime
lending market where predatory lending is often found, so is the argument against
regulation to curb abuses.
One prerequisite of the homo economicus anthropology is that the decisions of
both parties to the transaction, the consumer and the mortgage broker, are rational
because each acts on information about the exchange that is at least reasonably
available to both. In other words, there is no artificial restriction on information
availability. Unfortunately, that assumption is often unwarranted. Because of age,
246. See STEIN, supra note 244, at 3 n.4 ("[H]omeownership represents the best possible
opportunity for families to build wealth and economic security and take their first steps into the middle
class.").
247. See Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory
Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 358-60 (2006).
248. Id. at 359.
249. See id. at 359 60 ("Although precise calculation of the externalities predatory lending
imposes on cities may be impossible, there is no doubt that predatory lending has an impact extending
beyond the borrowers themselves.").
250. For a description of homo economicus, see JOHNSTON, supra note 20, at 49 50 (describing
homo economicus as a wealth or utility maximizer and criticizing the isolation and
compartmentalization of life with conflicting value systems that follow). See also Sargent, supra note
18, at 39, 46-47 (stating that the term "purports... to be a description of the autonomous individual's
practice ofmaking rational choices that maximize her preferences" and criticizing the anthropology that
results from the view of human nature that follows from homo economicus). Some persons might
criticize the characterization of liberalism in this Article as a caricature that does not reflect the more
nuanced view of neo-liberalism. Such a criticism misses the point that what matters for this discussion
is the way that members of Congress understand liberalism, not academics.
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education level, English language proficiency, race, or disconnection from
traditional banking services,25' victims of predatory lending frequently lack
knowledge about the complexities of mortgage based financing and either do not
appreciate that they need an advocate, do not know how to find one, or do not think
they can afford one.
In fact, the realization that such information disparity exists explains the origin
ofthe education, counseling, and disclosure methodologies for combating predatory
lending. By providing consumers with access to information, these methodologies
are thought to validate the rational actor model of homo economicus. 212 That
conclusion is unjustified given mortgage brokers' ability to manipulate the loan
application and loan closing processes. Such manipulations can prevent consumers
from accessing these sources of information on a timely basis, if at all, or can
negate the effect of any information a consumer may have acquired. So long as the
responsibility for making disclosures is left in the hands of brokers and lenders
whose interests are threatened by informed consumers, the purpose of disclosures
will not be realized.
Even if information disparity was not a problem, a second flaw in this
anthropology is the assumption that homo economicus makes rational choices in
pursuit of individual preferences. This assumption is unwarranted for two reasons.
First, human rationality is both bounded 2 3 and exploitable.254 An availability
heuristic, an optimism heuristic, and an anchoring heuristic combine to cause
consumers to underestimate the risk of default and its repercussions and to limit a
loan consumer's "rational pursuit" of a loan.255 It could be argued that these
heuristics prove too much as they would apply to all transactions, not just to
consumers seeking mortgage loans. What makes these heuristics stand out in
predatory lending is that mortgage brokers intentionally capitalize on them to
251. See, e.g., Pearl Chin, Note, Payday Loans: The Case for Federal Legislation, 2004 U. ILL.
L. REV. 723, 728 (2004) (noting the use of "payday lenders" by low income groups because of their
lack of access to "traditional financial institutions"); Kristin Brandser Kalsem, Bankruptcy Reform and
the Financial Well-Being of Women: How Intersectionality Matters in Money Matters, 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 1181, 1229-30 (2006) (describing how predatory lenders target disenfranchised groups).
252. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 214-16 (1995) (explaining that human rationality is "bounded by limited
information and limited information processing"); David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground,
and Jefferson's Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1730 31 (2003) (noting that the human ability to solve
complex legal problems is bounded).
254. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2004) (noting
that credit card contracts are "shaped around consumers' systematic deviations from perfect
rationality"); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits oJfDisclosure: The Problem ofPredatory
Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 709, 757-59 (2006) (noting that consumers make decisions in a
cognitive and emotional context).
255. Forrester, supra note 89, at 384 85 (describing heuristics that affect decisionmaking and
their relationship to predatory lending); see also McCoy, supra note 21, at 726 34 (using mathematical
and statistical models to show weaknesses of the rational actor concept inherent in homo economicus
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produce "sub-optimal decisions by homeowners '2 56 with regard to property that
likely comprises the consumer's largest asset and fulfills the consumer's basic
human need for housing.
Predatory brokers and lenders promote sub-optimal decisions through "push
marketing" techniques that are designed to "exploit[] anomalies in consumer
behavior."2" These techniques include loss aversion,215 preference ordering,2. 9
psychological lock in,26° and the framing effect of reference dependence.26" '
Predatory lenders exploit these techniques to manipulate consumers into signing
loan agreements with abusive terms.262 Prospect theory and behavioral economics
establish the limitation of the rational actor premise of the homo economicus
anthropology.
The liberal hermeneutics has also been criticized on sociological grounds. First,
liberalism's emphasis on autonomous individualism has been criticized for its
atomizing effect, by which self-absorption and isolation displace interest in
communal well-being and social participation. 2" This isolation in turn has been
seen as threatening liberty by diminishing participation in public discourse and
ceding authority to a managerial model of government.264 Finally, this emphasis on
individualism has been described as revisionist history describing a "[w]ay [w]e
[n]ever [w]ere '2 65 and as less than fully faithful to the economic writings from
which it claims derivation.266
Through this emphasis on individualism, the liberal hermeneutics produces
tangible and undesirable ethical ramifications. Because lenders and brokers view
the world as populated by persons who fit the homo economicus anthropology, and
thus are both able and expected to look after themselves, the ethics standards
developed for differentiating between acceptable and unacceptable behavior adhere
to that view. Brokers and lenders are thus "free" to bargain for whatever terms a
consumer can be convinced to accept. Operating under the banners of free
256. McCoy, supra note 21, at 725.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 727-29.
259. Id. at 728-29.
260. Id. at 735.
261. Id. at 729 32.
262. Id. at 735, 739 (calling for the application of a "suitability standard" to predatory lending in
the subprime loan market, akin to the duty of suitability that securities brokers have applied for some
time).
263. ROBERTN. BELLAH ETAL., THE GOOD SOCIETY 118 (1991) ("[C]urrent generations, who are
considered to be obligated only to maximize their own welfare, are cut off from a sense of responsibility
to the future.").
264. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN
AMERICAN LIFE 211 (1985) (stating that powerful governments and corporations "mediate[ ]" life in
contemporary America and that dependence on this mediation "is not going to disappear[, and] [w]e
will either humanize them or they will tyrannize over us").
265. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE
NOSTALGIA TRAP 69 70 (1992) (debunking the myth of the self-sufficient individualist).
266. See JOHNSTON, supra note 20, at 109 (summarizing the historical critical methods applied
to economics and key economic theorists Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, John Start
Mill, Karl Marx, Alfred Marshall, John Maynard Keynes, and Milton Friedman).
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bargaining and personal responsibility, a broker need not think it unethical to
recommend a loan with a short-lived teaser interest rate and to disregard the
significantly higher, and potentially unaffordable, payments that will soon come
due. Similarly, a broker need not think it impermissible to propose a loan with a
balloon feature even though the broker knows the consumer does not understand
that the consumer will be locked into fee-laden refinancing. Also, a broker need not
have any ethical concerns about the unsuitability of a loan for the consumer's
situation, or about the broker's receipt of a yield spread premium for steering the
consumer to a higher loan rate than is warranted by the consumer's credit rating.
So long as a broker resists sinking to the level of illegality, fraud, duress, and
unconscionability, caveat emptor rules. The consumer is held to have understood
the legal and economic consequences of the deal on par with the most sophisticated
and predatory broker. Whether the consumer's decision to agree to a loan is
actually the product of actual bargaining or of rational decisionmaking is irrelevant.
If the consumer gets stuck with a deal that serves the interests of the creditor far
more than those of the consumer, that consumer is the one to blame for not living
up to the homo economicus standard and for not driving a better bargain.
It is not only mortgage brokers and lenders, however, whose behavior is
affected by the liberal hermeneutics. Legislators are also prone to accepting that
view uncritically, and as a result, they give consideration only to legislative
proposals that are consistent with the view. Consumer education, counseling, and
disclosures are acceptable approaches because they work within the arm's length
model of the relationship between a consumer and a mortgage broker. The liberal
hermeneutics thus produces a legislative myopia that renders other proposals
invisible, such as a proposal for a suitability requirement or a proposal to redefine
the consumer-broker relationship to include contractual or agency duties.
One final observation aboutthe liberal hermeneutics bears mention: itvalidates
a limited view of the role of law and ofthe meaning ofjustice. Under the liberalism
model, the emphasis is on providing a matrix of laws that will support the
negotiation, execution, and enforcement of bargain promises. The fairness of the
transaction is a matter generally left to be determined by the parties rather than by
a public body, be it a court or legislature. Procedural justice is seen as an
appropriate concern; substantive or distributive justice generally is not. The
unfortunate result of that view is that the law is capable of shielding consumers
from predatory lenders and brokers.
For any problem or issue, one would expect several hermeneutical approaches
to be identified and applied. This expectation is not borne out with regard to the
proposals for federal regulation ofhigh-cost loans in general or of mortgage brokers
in particular. Even proposals that genuinely seek to protect consumers from
predatory terms and practices are often bound to the liberal hermeneutics and the
homo economicus anthropology.267 An alternative hermeneutics and anthropology,
which does not just judge the individual but also focuses on communitarian
267. See Sargent, supra note 18, at 39 (citations omitted).
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concerns, is homo salutaris.268 For homo salutaris, personal well-being is not
measured solely in terms of maximized individual utility, and communal well-being
is not defined simply as an aggregate of individual utilities.26 9 Instead, the homo
salutaris hermeneutics sees individuals as existing in a community and sees
personal well-being as inseparable from communal well-being.27 ° For homo
salutaris, communal values are constitutive of human well-being, not derivative.
27'
Introducing a homo salutaris hermeneutics into the discussion of mortgage
brokers regulation and of federal preemption of state regulation enlarges the debate
and provides a structure for introducing additional and competing values. Issues
that are perceived dimly, or not at all because of the arm's length bargaining model
assumed by the liberal hermeneutics, find expression under a homo salutaris
hermeneutics. The homo salutaris hermeneutics also enlarges the range of
regulatory tools that can be considered. Instead of limiting tools to those that tweak
the arm's length bargaining model, such as education, counseling, and disclosures,
the homo salutaris hermeneutics critically examines the arm's length bargaining
model itself. Finally, the introduction of the homo salutaris hermeneutics opens the
door to the introduction of other hermeneutical approaches. Alternative
hermeneutics would provide additional ways to frame the important questions
involved in mortgage broker regulation, as well as other aspects of predatory
lending. The undeniable results, it seems, would be fuller examination of the issues
than exists today and better public policy decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article considered proposals for federal regulation of mortgage brokers
on two levels. One level is deconstructive. On that level, this Article contends that
the constituent provisions of two bills introduced in Congress to create federal-level
regulation of mortgage brokers lack utility because they only partially duplicate
provisions already found in state mortgage broker licensing laws. Thus, they
contribute nothing new to controlling the behavior of predatory brokers. At the
same time, the federal proposals fail to include many of the broker regulation
mechanisms that state licensing laws do contain.
The second level on which the proposals for federal regulation were considered
is integrative, as they were analyzed with regard to their implications for the
preemption debate and with regard to the hermeneutical bias that currently frames
and limits proposals to combat predatory lending. This Article demonstrates that the
preemptive effect of federal regulation involves more than simply those provisions
expressly directed at mortgage broker licensing. Other provisions contained in
regulations aimed at high-cost loans in general also significantly impact a state's
ability to determine who can be subjected to licensure requirements and what steps
268. See JOHNSTON, supra note 20, at 122 23.
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a state can take to oversee broker behavior once a license is granted. The outcome
is a stealth preemption of state authority.
This Article also found that the bills are grounded on and perpetuate a
hermeneutical bias in favor of economic liberalism. The dominant status ofthat bias
is unmerited for several reasons: it is based on a faulty anthropology, it validates
undesirable ethics, and its question-framing power restricts the field of
"permissible" responses to predatory lending. These defects are highlighted by the
introduction of an alternative hermeneutics, homo salutaris, which sees
communitarian concerns as constitutive rather than simply derivative of individual
utility.
The proposals for federal regulation of mortgage brokers most recently
introduced in Congress should not be supported, and the proposals that are certain
to be introduced in the 110th Congress and beyond should be examined closely for
the failings and traps identified in this Article. Even those proposals that might
purport to establish minimum regulatory standards should be examined critically
to ensure that there is no interference with the gatekeeping, regulatory oversight or
relationship-defining functions of state mortgage broker licensing statutes. Only
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